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I. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
The traditional insanity defense is both a legal anachronism and a concept ill-suited to
modem psychological theory. It presents issues-important issues-that are not suscep-
tible of intelligent resolution in the courtroom environment. Trials in which the insanity
defense has been raised often have degenerated into swearing contests between opposing
teams of expert witnesses, all of whom are forced to translate the language of the psy-
chiatric profession into the quite alien language of the legal profession. It is this attempt to
marry these two incompatible disciplines that has created the current confusion.'
Public opinion reveals opposition to the insanity defense, 2 with the view often
expressed that too many criminals escape punishment by pleading and, in some
instances, feigning insanity.3 The general view is that the insanity defense is too
frequently used and is too often a means for defendants to escape their just
punishment. 4
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I. The Insaniry Defense: Hearings Before the Conan. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on Bills to Amend
Title 18 to Limit the Insaniry Defense, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982) (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on the insanity" Defensel.
2. See Lauter, Why Insanity Defense Is Breaking Down. Nat'l L.J.. May 3, 1982. at I. col. 1. The author reports:
'[Ain Associated PressINBC News poll showed that 87 percent of the public believed that too many murderers were using
insanity pleas to avoid jail. Nearly 70 percent would have banned insanity defenses altogether in murder cases." Id. at 1I,
col. 1.
3. See Behind Growing Outrage over Insanity Plea, U.S. NEws & VORLD REP., May 7. 1979. at 41; see also I S.
YOCtELSON & S. SAMENOW, THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY 529-30 (1975). See generally A. BROOKS. LAW. PSYCIATRY
AND TiE MENTAL HEALTH S*s'ms, 318 (1974).
4. See generally Cohen, It's a Mad. Mad Verdict, NEW REPUBLIC. July 12, 1982. at 13; The Insaui Or Plea on Trial,
NEWSWEEK. May 24. 1982, at 56. Is the System Guilty, TIME, July 5. 1982. at 22.
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A second strain of adverse public opinion centers on the perceived misuse of
psychiatry by defendants5 or reflects simply a general distrust of psychiatrists, who
are viewed as providing an excuse for crime for any defendant who has the means or
opportunity to "employ" a psychiatric witness.
6
A third source of public dissatisfaction with the insanity defense is a perception
that those who successfully plead the insanity defense are freed from any institutional
restraint7 or, even when hospitalized, are released too quickly by mental health
authorities. 8 The general view is that the insanity defense results in dangerous per-
sons being set free into the community with a likelihood that they will continue to
commit violent and dangerous acts.9
Empirical studies increasingly reveal that much of this public opinion is mis-
taken,10 although a need to examine the formulation and operation of the insanity
defense persists. Legal commentators I and medical authorities,' 2  as well as bar
5. See Gallo, The Insanity of the Insanity Defense, HUMAN EvNrrs, Sept. 26, 1981, at 12, where the author
observes:
The Hinckley affair, as well as a number of other notorious criminal cases, has focused attention on the extent to
which psychiatry has undermined justice in the United States by justifying criminality. As a result, a growing
number of lawmakers, jurists, and even psychiatrists are suggesting sweeping changes in insanity pleadings at
both the state and federal levels.
6. See Egan & Levin, An Attorney's View of the Insanity Defense, Loy. MAG., Summer 1982, at 7. The authors
report:
The insanity defense is criticized on many levels. Some object to the defense because they believe it is only
available to the rich. It is only the rich, they say, who can afford to hire the psychiatrists necessary to present a
successful defense. Hinckley prevailed, according to this view, because his father could "purchase" the
testimony necessary to achieve a "Not Guilty" result.
Id. at 8.
7. See The Controversy over Criminal Insanity, PsYCiOLOoGY TODAY, May 1983, at 49, where it is observed:
The criminal-justice system has been shaken by two widespread misconceptions about defendants judged "not
guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI). The first is that many of these offenders are really sane and escaping
punishment in hospitals. The second is that hospitals and courts are releasing both the sane and the genuinely
insane so soon that society is menaced by their return.
8. See Burton & Steadman, Legal Professionals' Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 6 J. PsYcHiATRY & L. 173
(1978). The authors report on the opinion of 293 legal professionals in New York State on the use and administration of
the insanity defense. While the authors report a relatively accurate perception of the actual percentages of the crimes for
which people were tried and acquitted under the New York insanity statute, they observe:
At the other end of the dispositional process, 74% of the respondents felt that the current standards of release of
NGRI defendants from mental hygiene facilities were too lax .... DA's and judges were most critical, with
90% of the DA's and 79% of the judges feeling that release standards are too lax, compared to 60% of the public
defenders and 52% of the private attorneys.
Id. at 180.
9. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
10. See Pasewark, Insanity Plea: A Review of the Research Literature, 9 J. PsYCHIATmY & L. 357, 361 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Pasewark, Research Literature]. The author observes:
[T]he available data suggest that accurate information is not held by elements of the population concerning such
matters as the incidence and success of the plea and who does or does not belong to the general group of the
criminally insane. Perhaps, this inaccurate information contributes to the negative feelings by many groups.
Id.
11. See, e.g., Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194 (1983). The author, a legal
scholar, states as his basic premise that "[sweeping proposals to abolish the insanity defense should be rejected in favor
of proposals to narrow it and shift the burden of proof to the defendant. " Id. at 194; see also Dershowitz, Abolishing the
Insanity Defense: The Most Significant Feature of the Administration's Proposed Criminal Code-An Essay, 9 CR i. L.
BULL. 434 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Prelinger, Dilemmas of the Expert Witness: Reflections on the Insanity Defense, 13 PsycluArRIc
ANNALS 237 (1983). The author observes, "In my own view [the insanity defensel serves, among other things, the
preservation of a meaningful concept of individual responsibility in our society." Id. at 238. The author recommends
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associations 13 and psychiatric associations,' 4 while recognizing a moral and legal
need to retain the insanity defense, recently have recommended various reforms of
the defense. Some commentators have suggested that the control or impulse ground
for the insanity defense be eliminated, confining the defense to a showing of lack of
appreciation or understanding by one accused of crime. 5 Others have suggested that
evidence of mental disorder be limited to defeating a requisite mental state, a position
that effectively would abolish the defense.' 6 Reforms in the manner in which the
defense is established have also been proposed, including, for example, the sugges-
tion that the burden of proof of insanity should be cast as an affirmative defense and
restrictions on the scope of psychiatric testimony on the ultimate question of responsibility. He concludes. "I have come
to see merit in the view that psychiatric and psychological expert witnesses should not answer this [ultimate] question
.... [Tlhe role of expert witness would be redefined as that of a provider of facts, observations, and qualified inference
and opinion." Id. at 240; see also Stone, The Insanihy Defense on Trial, 33 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 634
(1982).
13. See STANDING COMM. ON ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A.B.A., FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1 (1983). A supporting memorandum reports:
In re-examining the insanity defense, the options for change were limited. The first option was to retain
ABA policy favoring the cognitive-volitional test embodied within the ALI's Model Penal Code. The next
option was to restrict the defense by eliminating the "volitional" prong of the ALl test while retaining and
perhaps redefining the "cognitive" portion of that test. Finally, the last option was to adopt the "mens rea"
approach-an approach which would eliminate insanity as an independent, exculpatory doctrine. This option-
the so-called "mens rea" limitation-was rejected out of hand. It represents the abolitionist approach and would
do away with an independent, exculpatory defense of insanity. Such a jarring reversal of hundreds of years of
moral and legal history would constitute an unfortunate and unwarranted overreaction to the Hinckley verdict.
Id. § 7-6.1 commentary at 7-262. The ABA chose the second option. Id. § 7-6.1.
14. See. e.g., American Psychiatric Association Statement on tMe 1nsanity Defense, reprinted in 140 AsM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 681-88 (1983). The statement provides, "The American Psychiatric Association. speaking as citizens as
well as psychiatrists, believes that the insanity defense should be retained in some form." Id. at 683. The statement
continues:
This area for potential reform of the insanity defense is one of the most controversial. Some proposals would
limit psychiatric testimony in insanity defense trials to statements of mental condition . . . . A further limitation
upon psychiatric "ultimate issue" testimony would be to restrict the psychiatrist from testifying about whether a
defendant did or did not meet the particular legal test for insanity at issue . . . . The American Psychiatric
Association is not opposed to legislatures restricting psychiatric testimony about the aforementioned ultimate
legal issues concerning the insanity defense.
Id. at 686.
15. See, e.g., Hearings on the Insanity Defense. supra note I. at 255, where, in a prepared statement, Richard J.
Bonnie, professor of law and Director of Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy, University of Virginia, asserted
his criticism of a separate control test for insanity:
I do not favor abolition of the "cognitive" prong of the insanity defense. However, I do agree with those critics
who believe the risks of fabrication and "moral mistakes" in administering the defense are greatest when the
experts and the jury are asked to speculate whether the defendant had the capacity to "control" himself or
whether he could have "resisted" the criminal impulse.
Id. at 276. Bonnie proposes that "[tlhe sole test of legal insanity should be whether the defendant, as a result of mental
disease, lacked 'substantial capacity' to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct." Id. at 278; see also MESSAGE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMI'ITING A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION ENTITLED THE "COMPREIHENSIVE
CRItEM CONTROL ACT OF 1983," H.R. Doc. No. 98-32, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1983). ,ire generally D. HER5IANN.
THE INSANITY DEFENSE. PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECrIVES 137-52 (1983).
16. See. e.g., Hearings on the Insanity Defense, supra note I, at 26-31 (statement of Attorney General William
French Smith). The Attorney General testified in support of a bill that "would effectively eliminate the insanity defense
except in those rare cases in which the defendant lacked the state of mind required as an element of the offense." Id. at 29.
According to the Attorney General,
This would abolish the insanity defense to the maximum extent permitted under the Constitution and would
make mental illness a factor to be considered at the time of sentencing, just like any other mitigating factor. It
would eliminate entirely as a test whether a defendant knew his actions were morally wrong and whether he
could control his behavior.
Id. at 30.
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placed on the defendant. 17 In addition, commentators have suggested revisions of the
methods in which psychiatric evidence is presented to the judge or jury, revisions
seeking to avoid confusion and to prevent psychiatric witnesses from effectively
determining the ultimate issue of responsibility.
18
While many of the suggested reforms may improve the operation of the defense
of insanity, most lawyers and psychiatrists would not recommend that the defense be
eliminated. A strong movement to eliminate the insanity defense, however, is sup-
ported by some commentators, 19 legislators, 20 and public officials. 2 1 Two states,
Montana 22 and Idaho, 23 effectively have eliminated the insanity defense, Idaho pro-
viding that "[m]ental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal
conduct." 2 4 This abolitionist movement seems most effectively to meet the demands
of public opinion.
To the extent that the abolitionist movement is supported by the public, two
basic issues arise: (1) Is public opposition to the insanity defense well founded?; and
(2) If public perceptions about the abuse and failings of the defense are not supported
by fact, what is the source of the public misconceptions? In one of the most extensive
studies of public opinion about the insanity defense, conducted in Wyoming, the
general public,25 legislators, 26 attorneys,27 law enforcement personnel, and mental
17. See, e.g., Hearings on the insanity Defense, supra note 1, at 18-24 (statement of Senator Dan Quale). Senator
Quale recommended legislation to "place the burden of proof upon the defendant to establish the defense of insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 19.
18. See. e.g., G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1975). The author
recommends that the legislature enact the following statute:
In a criminal case in which defendant has served notice of intent to defend on the ground of irresponsibility, the
trial court shall order, upon defendant's request, that evidence shall be presented first on whether defendant
committed the act that would constitute the crime if the requisite mental state for criminal responsibility is also
proven. At the completion of the presentation of this evidence, the jury shall determine whether the act was
committed by the defendant.
If the jury finds that the act was not committed by the defendant, the court shall enter a judgment of not
guilty. If the jury finds that the act was committed by the defendant, the trial shall resume before the same jury,
which shall hear evidence on whether the requisite mental state for criminal responsibility existed at the time
defendant acted. At the completion of the presentation of this evidence, the jury shall determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
Id. at 47-48.
19. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982). The author recommends. "In accordance
with the thesis of separation of the mental health law and the criminal-law powers to incarcerate. I propose the abolition of
the special defense of insanity." Id. at 53.
20. See, e.g.. Hearings on the Insanity Defense. supra note I. at 91-94 (statement of Senator Larry Pressler).
2 1. See, e.g.. Limiting tile Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subconm. on Criminal Lai' of the Senate Comm.
on tile Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 308-20 (1982) (statement of David H. Leroy, Attorney General for the state of
Idaho). See also Smith, Limiting tile Ilnsanity Defense: A Rational Approach to Irrational Crinles, 47 Mo. L. REV. 605
(1982). Attorney General William French Smith stated the view of the Department of Justice on limiting the insanity
defense:
Having re-examined the matter in light of the recent public debate, we in the Department have again concluded
that the soundest approach is: (I) to eliminate insanity as a special defense and to permit conviction of any
defendant as long as both the conduct and the state of mind specified in the applicable penal statute are found to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 615.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(36), 46-14-102, 46-14-201 (1981).
23. IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (Supp. 1983).
24. Id.
25. See Pasewark & Seidenzahl, Opinions Concerning the Insanit' Plea atld Criminality Among Mental Patients. 7
BULL. ANI. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 199 (1979).
26. See Pasewark & Pantle, Ilsanitv Plea: Legislator's View. 136 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 222 (1979).
27. See Pasewark & Craig, Insanity Plea: Defense Attorneys' Views. 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 413 (1980).
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health personnel 28 were questioned about their perceptions and attitudes toward the
insanity defense. The results of these surveys indicate that each group grossly over-
estimated the frequency of use and the success of the plea.29 Court records show that
during the period of the study only 102, or 0.47%, of those charged with criminal
offenses entered an insanity plea, and only one defendant was successful in obtaining
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. 30 Nevertheless, estimates of the frequen-
cy of its use ranged from thirteen percent by state hospital professional staff to
fifty-seven percent by state hospital aides. 31 Community residents estimated that
forty-three percent of all criminal defendants entered the plea.32 The successful
employment of the defense was also grossly overestimated, with estimates ranging
from nineteen percent by community mental health professionals 33 to thirty-eight
percent by the general public. 34 All groups surveyed, with the exception of state
legislators, expressed the opinion that the defense of insanity should be abolished. 35
One of the most informative and most disturbing of the Wyoming surveys was
that conducted among university students. The students estimated that thirty-seven
percent of all persons charged with a felony entered an insanity plea and that forty-
four percent of the persons pleading insanity were acquitted. 36 The authors of this
report concluded:
[Riespondents appear to believe that the insanity plea is too often employed as a mech-
anism whereby persons charged with a crime escape culpability for their criminal action.
Contributing to this belief seems to be a gross misimpression held concerning both the
number of persons who make the plea as well as the number who are eventually successful
in the plea. In this, for lack of a better explanation, we are forced to assume that the basis
for the misinformation held about the plea derives from widespread publicity given to
notorious [not guilty by reason of insanity] cases by the various media. 37
The negative opinion toward the insanity defense stems from a myriad of fac-
tors. One study reports that jurors with negative attitudes toward an insanity plea are
most influenced by stereotyped images of offenders, as well as by negative attitudes
toward psychiatry.38 Another study reports that dissatisfaction with the insanity de-
fense is based on a judgment that the defense is poorly defined and is often based on
superficial and incompetent medical testimony, as well as on "preconceived ideas
about the defendant 'getting off.' ,,39 Perhaps one of the most telling studies is a
public opinion survey conducted in New York in 1975.4o This study first attempted to
28. See Pasewark. Seidenzahl & Pantie. OpinionsAbout the Insanity Plea, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 63 (1981).
29. Pasewark. Research Literature, supra note 10. at 360.
30. Id.
31. Pasewark, Seidenzahl & Pantie, supra note 28, at 66.
32. Pasewark. Research Literature, supra note 10, at 360.
33. Pasewark, Seidenzahl & Pantie, supra note 28. at 66.
34. Pasewark, Research Literature. supra note 10, at 360.
35. Id.
36. Pasewark & Seidenzahl, supra note 25, at 201.
37. Id. at 202.
38. Arafat & McCahery. The Insanity Defense and the Juror, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 538. 548-49 (1973).
39. Burton & Steadman, supra note 8, at 177.
40. Steadman & Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the Public's Misconceptions of the Crimninallr Insane, 41 PuB.
OPiNION Q. 523 (1978).
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determine how the public perceived the criminally insane and whether those per-
ceptions were accurate. The researchers reported that "[t]he public's conception of
the criminally insane is dominated by fear of the unpredictability and the danger they
are perceived to present." 4 1 The public's image of the criminally insane, its percep-
tion of the incidence of the insanity defense, and its conception of the criminal
context in which the defense was asserted were found to be "highly erroneous":
"Whereas murderers make up a very small segment of all the individuals who are
usually [found] insane, murderers or alleged murderers, particularly presidential
assassins or mass murderers, were the only type repeatedly named by
respondents.' 42
The researchers concluded that the false public perceptions were a result of
distorted media reporting, reasoning that the public's awareness of the criminally
insane was dependent on the media and that "[w]hen such dependence is coupled
with selective reporting, and/or distorted dramatizations, false perceptions are de-
veloped." 43 The researchers concluded their report with an observation of the danger
attendant to distorted reporting and consequential erroneous public opinion: "The
false perceptions are then related to inappropriate fear, which in turn can be seen
reflected in restrictive legislation and questionable public policy. In the public's fear
of the criminally insane, selective news reporting appears to have contributed through
the development of false perceptions. "4
II. THE INSANITY PLEA
A. Introduction
The Insanity Plea,45 by William Winslade and Judith Ross, is a general critique
of the insanity defense directed toward the general public, which deals with a series
of reported cases. This book will probably reinforce erroneous public opinion on the
subject of the insanity defense. It also will probably be used by the general public as
commanding evidence to support abolition or substantial restriction of the defense.
The public may consider this book authoritative in part because Winslade is a co-
director of the Program in Medicine, Law and Human Values, and an adjunct pro-
fessor of law and medicine, at the University of California, Los Angeles. Because the
public is likely to rely on this widely distributed book, it merits close examination.
The Insanity Plea is based on trial transcripts and judicial opinions from seven
prominent cases in which psychiatric evidence was introduced; 46 the cases do not all
involve insanity pleas. The authors explain that they have relied on these official
records, rather than conducting interviews or engaging in other basic research, to give
the reader a juror's perspective on these cases.4 7 However, the book is barren of
41. Id. at 532.
42. Id. at 531.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. W. WINSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE INSANrTY PLEAI.




citation or other reference that would be useful to anyone who wishes to critically
evaluate the authors' interpretation of the record of these cases. This review will
attempt to supply citations to official accounts of these cases to the extent that they
are readily available.
1. Underlying Assumption that the Guilty Go Free
The authors state the premise of their book quite simply:
The not guilty by reason of insanity plea is not used very often and is not very often
successful. But when it is successful, the result is frequently such an obvious abuse of the
idea of insanity and nonresponsibility that the verdict enrages the public and tarnishes both
the legal system and the psychiatric profession.4a
Winslade and Ross recommend eliminating the insanity plea and removing psychi-
atrists as expert witnesses at trials.4 9
An underlying assumption of the book which is not supported by any empirical
proof is that the insanity defense results in a number of "guilty" people "go[ing]
free." ' 50 According to the authors,
These people go free because their lawyers have successfully pursued a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity by hiring psychiatrists to examine the defendant and to testify to his
mental incapacities and to the personal weaknesses that suggest he not be held responsible
for the crime he is charged with. These defendants can go free because some lawyers and
some psychiatrists are willing to manipulate juries and the criminal justice system pre-
cisely in those areas where judgment is most difficult: where judgment is based upon
imagining what was in a person's mind when he committed an act.5 1
This view is subject to two criticisms. The first approach is to question the
authors' assertion that lawyers and psychiatrists "manipulate" juries to produce
acquittals that are not supported by the law and the facts of the case. The issue,
assuming that the insanity plea provides a legitimate defense, is whether counsel and
witnesses misstate the facts or confuse jurors so that the jurors are induced to find an
unsupported verdict. Empirical studies of jury deliberations involving the defense of
insanity do not support the authors' assertion. Rita James Simon's study, The Jury
and the Defense of Insanity,52 provides major findings that are quite contrary to the
assumption made by Winslade and Ross. Simon reports:
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id. The full recommendation of the authors is stated at the conclusion of the book:
A workable solution would require the elimination of the insanity plea; the elimination of any testimony by
psychiatrists about the actual or theoretical state of the defendant's mind at the time of the crime, the elimination
of psychiatric expert witnesses in the guilt phase of a trial: and the requirement of a bifurcated trial that would, in
its first phase establish guilt or innocence of the commission of the crime with no concern for the individual's
state of mind in terms of mental illness at the time the crime was committed. The second phase of the trial, if
guilt were found, would address itself to the appropriate disposition of the defendant.
Id. at 219.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id.
52. R. StttON. THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE oF INSANITY (1967).
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The first and perhaps most important observation is the jury's concern with the case. The
jurors relied very heavily on the record. They reviewed every piece of evidence presented
during the trial and they placed particular emphasis on the details surrounding the de-
fendant's behavior at the time of the crime. The opinions they formed about the defendant
were developed in reaction to the particular circumstances surrounding the crime. 53
Simon's study also controverts the suggestion by Winslade and Ross that the de-
fendant goes free because "some psychiatrists are willing to manipulate juries" or,
alternatively, that "the defendant goes free because psychiatrists and psychologists-
presumed to be expert witnesses on the contents and functioning of the human
mind-have been asked by lawyers and are permitted by law to tell us who is
responsible and who is not; who is guilty, and who is insane." 54 Simon reports:
We think that the data demonstrate that the jury recognizes the distinction between a
clinical diagnosis and the application of a moral legal criterion, and they understand it is
the latter which they must use in deciding the case....
The jury realizes that the expert is emphasizing only one aspect of the problem, the
clinical part, and that his testimony contributes little or nothing to the main dilemma
facing the jury-that of placing the clinical or purely medical facts about the defendant
into a moral-legal context ...
• ..[Mlost of the jurors, most of the time, recognized that the final responsibility for
the defendant's fate rested with them. 55
The second criticism appropriately directed at the assumption underlying The
Insanity Plea is an objection to the equation of guilt, that is, criminal guilt or legal
responsibility, with causal responsibility of a person for acts of harm or injury that
underlie a criminal charge. Winslade and Ross make the general observation that
"[p]erhaps the bottom line of all these complaints is that guilty people go free-
guilty people who do not have to accept judgment or responsibility for what they have
done and are not held accountable for their actions." 56 Regarding insanity acquittees
in particular, the authors assert: "These are not cases in which the defendant is
alleged to have committed a crime. Everyone knows he did it."'57 Thus, the sugges-
tion is made that causal responsibility is or should be the necessary and sfficient
basis for criminal guilt. But this surely is not the view of the criminal law as it has
developed in Anglo-American societies. Causal responsibility must be joined to both
a voluntary act and a requisite mental state for criminal responsibility to be found.s
In addition, for criminal guilt to be found, the defendant must not be justified in his
action, as in self defense, or excused as a result of some incapacity or recognized
attendant circumstance like infancy, mistake, or necessity. 59
53. Id. at 175-76.
54. TttE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 2-3.
55. R. SINION, supra note 52, at 177.
56. Tile INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 2.
57. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g.. Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126 (1873). The court observed. "in law, the commission of a crime consists
in the joint operation of act and intent or criminal negligence." Id. at 128; see also People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1. 609
P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment at 123 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The general requisites for criminal
liability are set forth as follows:
[Cllear analysis requires that the question of the kind of culpability required to establish the commission of an
offense be faced separately with respect to each material element of the crime [and] the concept of "material
[Vol. 44:987
19831 THE INSANITY DEFENSE 995
The authors' equation of criminal guilt with causal responsibility has much
broader implications than a mere challenge to the insanity defense. Winslade and
Ross challenge the basic concept of criminal responsibility and its requirement of a
culpable mental state. They thus join others like Barbara Wootton who have sug-
gested the elimination of mens rea as a requisite for criminal liability. 60 The ground
for the attack on the mental element requirement is that a state of mind is not a fact
susceptible of proof; the authors argue:
"Who did it?" is a question of fact, one that is, at least theoretically, capable of being
answered definitively. "What was the perpetrator's state of mind when he did it?" is not a
question of fact, for we do not even know what we mean by "state of mind," cannot
define its elements, and, even if we could, would have no way of telling whether the
definitions were met in a given case.
6
'
According to Winslade and Ross, the problems with the mental state requirement
generally are made more acute with the insanity defense: "With an insanity defense
the trial asks a question about an internal, subjective phenomenon, about the state of
mind, which cannot be observed by others, photographed by cameras, or tested
retroactively.' 62 The authors seemingly qualify their position when they observe that
although "there is no external, direct evidence of state of mind," there may be
element- includes the facts that negative defenses on the merits as well as the facts included in the definition of
the crime.
Id.
60. Although Winslade and Ross do not refer to the work of Barbara Wootton, her views have either heavily
influenced or, at least, are strikingly similar to those of the authors on both the issue of mental state and the defense of
insanity. See B. WoorroN. CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1963). Wootton summarizes her conclusion in these terms:
The conclusion to which the argument leads is, I think, not that the presence or absence of the guilty mind
is unimportant, but that mens rea has, so to speak-and this is the crux of the matter-got into the wrong place.
Traditionally, the requirement of the guilty mind is written into the actual definition of a crime. No guilty
intention, no crime, is the rule. Obviously this makes sense if the law's concern is with wickedness: when there
is no guilty intention, there can be no wickedness. But it is equally obvious, on the other hand, that an action
does not become innocuous merely because whoever performed it meant no harm. If the object of the criminal
law is to prevent the occurrence of socially damaging actions, it would be absurd to turn a blind eye to those
which were due to carelessness, negligence or even accident. The question of motivation is in thefirst instance
irrelevant.
But only in the first instance. At a later stage, that is to say, after what is now known as a conviction, the
presence or absence of guilty intention is all-important for its effect on the appropriate measure to be taken to
prevent a recurrence of the forbidden act.
Id. at 52-53 (emphasis in original). The similarity of the argument made by Winslade and Ross to Wootton's position is
apparent in the conclusion of The Insanit" Plea; Winslade and Ross write: "'Any solution must of necessity eliminate the
hope of finding some way to assess mental states accurately. We must, at least as long as our knowledge is limited, give
up on that as one of the elements of our resolution.'" THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 219. The issue of culpable
mental states and, consequently, evidence of mental illness, would be relegated to a dispositional hearing according to the
recommended reform offered by Winslade and Ross: "Adversarial psychiatric testimony would be limited to clinical
assessments, and would not include predictions or postdictions of behavior. The second phase of trial would also require
assessments of treatability." Id. at 220.
61. TiE lNsANr PLEA. supra note 45, at 8.
62. Id. at 9. The authors assert. "'A trial that features an insanity defense .... asks 'did the man mean to fire the
gun and cause the injury?' or 'could he or did he choose to fire the gun?' None of the factual evidence is relevant here."
Id. (emphasis in original). See B. \vooTroN. supra note 60, at 74, where Wootton maintains, -Logic, experience and the
Lord Chief Justice thus all appear to lead to the same conclusion-that is to say, to the impossibility of establishing any
reliable measure of responsibility in the sense of a man's ability to have acted otherwise than as he did." According to
Wootton. "'The questions: who broke the window? and could the man who broke the window have prevented himself from
doing so? are obviously quite distinct. To dismiss the second as unanswerable in no way diminishes the importance of
finding an answer to the first.' Id. at 76.
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"indirect evidence"; this indirect evidence, however, is dismissed by the authors as
"weak" or at best subject to various "interpretations." 63
Several objections can be made to eliminating the mental element as a requisite
for criminal culpability. First, some offenses have knowledge or intention as a neces-
sary feature. 64 For example, the crimes of murder and involuntary manslaughter are
differentiated by the quality of the mental state that accompanies a killing. 65 Of
course, one can argue that this distinction should be eliminated and killing simply
should be denominated as the crime of homicide. Even with all killing punished as
homicide, however, if a defense of justification, such as self defense, is to exist, the
question of whether the requirements of the defense are met will arise. This question
will necessarily include an inquiry about the defendant's mental state if the defense is
predicated on a requirement of reasonable fear that one's life was in jeopardy. 66
Second, even if one could eliminate the mental state requirement, the question
arises whether this change in the law would be desirable. The law has long recog-
nized that in human experience persons distinguish intended results from accidental
happenings. People distinguish benefits received from others that are intended from
those that are unintended and are the necessary or accidental side effects of another's
action; gratitude is expressed to another person in a case of intended benefit while it
usually is withheld in the case of unintended benefit. Similarly, a person usually
distinguishes the conduct of others intended to do him harm from conduct which
accidentally or unintentionally has a harmful effect on him. Mr. Justice Holmes
distilled this general experience in the aphorism, "[E]ven a dog distinguishes be-
tween being stumbled over and being kicked." 6 7 The criminal law embodies this
universal distinction in the concept of the mental state requirement, and the law
distinguishes between the seriousness of crimes on the basis of whether a harm was
intended or not. To eliminate the mental state requirement would be to deny the
criminal law the ability to make distinctions that are common to human experience.
A third objection to eliminating the mental state requirement is that this choice
would deprive the law of a richer notion of accountability than is provided by mere
causal responsibility; it would deprive the law of a principle that promotes ethical and
legal values. The influence of the concept of responsibility based on distinguishing
conduct that is done purposefully, intentionally, or knowingly has long been viewed
as an important influence on human behavior. As one commentator observed:
63. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 9.
64. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 27, at 191-95 (1972) ("The Mental Part-In
General") [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW].
65. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Section 210.2 provides in part,
"[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder.when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Id. Section 210.3 provides
in part, "Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is committed recklessly; or (b) a homicide which would
otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse." Id. § 210.3.
66. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Section 3.04 provides for a justification
of killing based on self defense and declares in part: "[The use of force upon or toward another person is justified when
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of
unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." Id.
67. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
[Vol. 44:987
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
IT]he individual who perceives himself as free and responsible behaves very differently
than the individual who believes that he lacks choice and responsibility. In general, the
direction of this difference is toward a higher level of awareness, initiative, achievement,
independence and complexity for those who perceive themselves as freely choosing to
behave in certain ways and as responsible for their behavior.
68
A fourth, perhaps crucial response to the position taken by Winslade and Ross
focuses on whether the mental state is a fact that can be established. The authors are
ambiguous in their position; it is unclear whether they are denying that mental states
are facts, or simply asserting that it is difficult to establish or disprove a specific
mental state given a particular action. If the former, they are simply wrong; if the
latter, the issue is whether one has sufficient confidence in the indirect evidence
developed through inference from one's own mental state when acting in a similar
manner, or in judgments based on the credibility of a person claiming or denying that
a particular mental state accompanied his action. The factual nature of a given mental
state, such as one's intent, has long been recognized as a decidable issue in the law.
As one commentator has observed:
Evidence one way or another for the existence of a particular specific intent is
publicly available, just as is evidence of any other feature of the act. Why one traveled to
Chicago may call for inference and surmise from things said and done as well as from
circumstances that would normally prompt a trip of one sort or another. The evidence is
no different from that available to determine the purpose being pursued in any other act;
and certainly determinations of purpose are commonly and confidently made when neces-
sary in many kinds of legal proceedings, as well as everywhere else in life. 69
The position taken in The Insanity Plea suffers from too great an influence of
logical empiricism, which requires verification by empirical proof to establish
truth. 70 The authors' standard of factual evidence to establish mental state or intent,
and insanity, is simply too stringent;7' such a high standard of proof for subjective
states in the criminal law cannot be reconciled with the law's willingness to recognize
a broad range of subjective facts such as "pain and suffering" in tort law and
"agreement" in contract law.
68. Monahan. Abolish the Insaniry Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 719. 723 (1973).
69. H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 101 (1979).
70. See A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE. TRUTH AND LOGIC 35 (rev. ed. 1946), where a leading proponent of logical
empiricism sets out the verification theory of meaning:
The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability.
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the
proposition which it purports to express--that is, if he knows what observations would lead him under certain
conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.
71. See J. BRENNAN, THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 63-66 (1953). The author identifies some of the principal
objections to the logical empiricist's verification of meaning:
I. This doctrine lays down an arbitrary and narrow definition of "meaning" in advance ofthe argument and
therefore begs the question....
2. Another objection concerns the vagueness of the word "verifiable." It is not at all clear just what specifica-
tion must be met in order that a sentence may be considered verified.
Id. at 63-64 (emphasis in original).
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2. Psychiatric Testimony
The argument developed in The Insanity Plea does not rest entirely on the claim
of lack of verification of mental state in general or insanity in particular. Rather, the
authors argue that even if mental state or insanity are facts or conditions that have a
factual quality, psychiatry has little or nothing to offer the courts or juries in the
determination of the existence of a mental condition, particularly a mental state or
condition accompanying some past act. Winslade and Ross bring the scientific status
of psychiatry into question:
Psychiatry does not have the kind of scientific base that exists for such areas as
forensic pathology. Much psychiatric theory is still disputed, with great disagreements
existing about what kind of behavior is abnormal, whether abnormality is a function of
heredity or environment, whether abnormality can be manifested psychologically without
a physical, bodily component, and whether diagnoses are anything more than de-
72scriptions.
More particularly, the authors question the value of psychiatric diagnosis to jurors
called on to make judgments about mental illness. It is suggested, first, that diagnos-
tic labels are misleading since they often give an "impressive-sounding name" to
ordinary observable behavior, or, alternatively, that diagnoses suffer from vagueness
and imprecision. 73 The core of the attack on the value of psychiatric evidence,
however, centers on three assertions: (1) that "[tihe bulk of psychiatric testimony
does not rest on any kind of testing," but "[r]ather, it is the psychiatrist's im-
pressions drawn from a series of interviews with the defendant"; (2) that "when it
comes to diagnoses, there is ample research evidence that there will be substantial
disagreement"; and (3) that psychiatric testimony about diagnosis is "opinion
only." '74 The general assertion is that psychiatric testimony about the defendant's
mental condition at the time of a crime is worthless because "[a]ll he [the psychiatric
expert] knows is what the defendant tells him. And the defendant who is planning to
make an insanity plea has every reason to tell the psychiatrist whatever he thinks will
get him off." 7
5
This critique of psychiatric testimony as it relates to diagnosis is not accurate.
The first assertion, that the psychiatric diagnosis does not rest on testing, but only on
statements of the defendant, is far from reality. A standard text of law and psychiatry
describes a proper psychiatric evaluation as having three parts: "a physical ex-
amination; a history of the person and his family; and a mental status examination." 7 6
A physical examination aims to determine whether a brain tumor or any brain
abnormality is present. 77 The examination requires sophisticated instrumentation,
72. TiE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 10.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 10-11.
75. Id. at 11.
76. Gerard, Pswchiatric Evaluation, in A. BROOKS, supra note 3. at 21. 22; see Nicholi. Historv and Mental Status.
in TilE HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 25 (A. Nicholi ed. 1978); Weiss, The Clinical Use of Psychological
Tests, in TiE HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 41 (A. Nicholi ed. 1978).
77. Gerard, supra note 76, at 22.
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such as an electroencephalograph, which records the electrical activity of the brain.
An examination of the patient's history includes a consideration of present illness and
of past, social, and family history.78 Information about the person's present illness
includes the mode of onset and the signs and symptoms of disorder. This data is
complemented with information about past medical history, evidence of history of
mental illness in the family, and information about the person's past behavior and
relationships. To acquire this information, not only the patient, but also family
members, fellow workers, and others who have known the subject, must be in-
terviewed by the examining physician or psychiatric social workers. Finally, the
mental status examination to which Winslade and Ross seem to refer is clearly a more
complex matter than simply judging whether the statements of the subject are truth-
ful. According to a standard text, "The mental status examination is commonly, but
incorrectly, thought of as constituting the entire psychiatric evaluation. The mental
status examination consists of six parts: (1) general appearance and behavior; (2)
stream of talk; (3) affect; (4) thought content; (5) sensorium; and (6) insight and
judgment." 79 A proper psychiatric evaluation leading to diagnosis is obviously much
more complex than Winslade and Ross suggest. While a psychiatric evaluation may
in any particular case fall short of these standards, a proper complaint should be
directed to the particular examination and not to the process in general.
The second assertion in The Insanity Plea is that necessarily there "will be
substantial disagreement in any group of psychiatrists about how to categorize be-
havior." 80 This claim is equally open to objection. Admittedly, a number of studies
done in the 1960s suggested that psychiatrists examining the same subject frequently
disagreed in their diagnosis.8 1 However, studies done in the last decade have demon-
strated much higher reliability and agreement on diagnosis.8 2 The development of the
current diagnostic system used by clinicians, DSM-1 11, has been accompanied by
demonstrations in field trials showing that good agreement and reliability in diagnosis
can be achieved.83 Moreover, disagreement, when it does occur, is not generally
disagreement over the presence of a mental disorder or even about the class of
disorder. One study reports:
[There is] good agreement as to whether or not the patient has a disorder within the
diagnostic class, even if there may be a disagreement about the specific disorder within
the class. For example, diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and catatonic schizophrenia
by two clinicians would be considered agreement in schizophrenia.
84
78. Id.
79. Id. at 23.
80. THE INSANrrY PLEA, supra note 45, at 10-11.
81. See, e.g., Beck, Ward & Mendelson, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: II. A Study of Consistency of Clinical
Judgments and Ratings, 119 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 351, 351-57 (1962); Sandifer, Pettus & Quade, A Study of Psychiatric
Diagnosis, 139 J. NERvous MENTAL DISEASE 350, 350-56 (1964).
82. See. e.g., Helzer, Clayton & Pambakian, ReliabilitY of Psychiatric Diagnosis: 11. The Test/Retest Reliabilitv of
Diagnostic Classification. 34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 136. 136-41 (1977); Spitzer. Endicott & Robbins, Diagnostic
Criteria: Rationale and Reliability, 35 ARCHiVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 773, 773-82 (1978).
83. Grove, Andreasen, McDonald-Scott, Keller & Shapiro. Reliability Studies of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 38 AR-
CiIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 408. 408 (1981).
84. Spitzer, Forman & Nee, DSM-II1 Field Trials: 1. Initial Interrater Diagnostic Reliability. 136 Am. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 815. 816-17 (1979).
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Therefore, evidence of substantial agreement on psychiatric diagnosis exists, con-
tradicting the authors' easy assertion to the contrary.
A third assertion is made by Winslade and Ross that "[w]hen a psychiatrist
gives his opinion in a court case, it is truly his opinion only." 8 5 This view is rooted in
the authors' basic premise that psychiatry does not have a firm scientific base; they
observe: "Much psychiatric theory is still disputed, with great disagreements existing
about what kind of behavior is abnormal, whether abnormality is a function of
heredity or environment, whether abnormality can be manifested psychologically
without a physical, bodily component, and whether diagnoses are anything more than
descriptions.' 86 Psychiatrists do often disagree about a particular diagnosis and, even
more significantly, on fundamental premises about psychological disorder. Some
psychiatrists view mental illness as an organic matter; others identify the source of
psychopathology in disordered mental processes.87 Nevertheless, although different
schools of psychiatry exist, this does not deny them scientific status. Each of the
major schools has a theoretical paradigm, is based on empirical studies, and has been
subject to verification by repeatable exercises.8 8 The diagnosis certainly will have
embedded within it the fundamental tenets of the school of psychiatry to which the
practitioner making the diagnosis subscribes. This fact, however, reveals that a
diagnosis is not mere opinion; rather, diagnosis involves the intersection of specific
observation and general theory.
3. Erosion of Individual Responsibility
Perhaps the most basic argument that Winslade and Ross make against the
insanity defense is that it undermines the concept of individual responsibility.
According to The Insanity Plea, this erosion of individual responsibility takes two
forms. The first follows from the assertion that "law and psychiatry are philosophi-
cally incompatible."
The law tells us that if we commit illegal acts, we must be punished. But the law assumes
that we have freely chosen to perform these acts. Psychiatry does not make any such
assumption about free will or choice. Psychiatric theory is deterministic and assumes that
behavior is caused, shaped, or determined by prior events-either immediate events or
those in the distant past-or by physiological states. 89
Whether any necessary philosophical conflict exists between law and psychiatry
concerning determinism and free choice is largely beside the point. The relationship
between law and psychiatry in the context of the insanity defense does not require
consideration of this purportedly deep conflict. It is true that certain insanity tests,
such as the product rule, ask whether criminal conduct is caused by mental disease, 90
85. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 10.
86. Id.
87. See A. HOLtUNGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLtESS 155-61 (1958), reprinted in A.
BROOKS, supra note 3, at 8-13.
88. T. KuHN, THE STRucTuRE OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLUTONS 73 (1970).
89. THE INSANrrY PLEA, supra note 45, at 12.
90. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled, United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Durham adopted the product test for insanity, which provided that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Id.
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and the irresistible impulse test requires a finding of a causal connection between a
mental disease and a crime. 9' The causal relation requirement of these tests is a good
reason for rejecting these tests for insanity; it is this causal requirement which ul-
timately led to the rejection of the product test in the District of Columbia. 92 Howev-
er, it is clear that this direct causal connection between mental disorder and a crime is
not required under the traditional test for insanity as developed under the M'Naghten
rules, 9 3 which require a determination of whether mental disease impaired the de-
fendant's ability to understand the nature and significance of his conduct. The crucial
difference in terms of the causal significance of mental disease between these two
approaches to the insanity test has been given explicit recognition by the courts.
9 4
The differentiation that avoids the conflict of law and psychiatry which Win-
slade and Ross see as inevitable was established by Aristotle when he distinguished
efficient cause, the antecedent circumstance or agent that produced an effect, and the
final cause, or the purpose or reason for which an effect was produced. 95 It is the
distinction between efficient cause and final cause that provides the basis for psy-
chiatric explanations and legal inquiry to be joined. According to one commentator,
The difference of the how and the why can be viewed in terms of causality. For our
purposes we can regard causes as of two kinds: those which imply deterministic necessity
and those which imply purpose. Science is mainly concerned with how things come
about....
The criminal trial is a forum for the determination of the fact of the wrong-doing and
the question "why" is implicit in the process of making a moral judgment and of
attaching a condemnation and penalty on the convicted wrong-doer....
In law, this implicit "why" is conveyed in the legal terms which qualify behavior.
Thus, did the wrong-doer have "intent"; did he act out of "malice aforethought, willful-
ness with premeditation," etc.? These qualifications are imposed on those who are to
make judgment. 96
91. See Parson v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (1887), which sets out the elements of the irresistible
impulse test for insanity as follows:
[H]e may nevertheless not be legally responsible if the two following conditions concur. (1 If, by reason of the
duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the power to choose between right and wrong, and to avoid
doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at the same time, the
alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the
product of it solely.
Id. (emphasis in original).
92. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), overruling Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
93. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843) provided that to establish the defense of insanity,
it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
94. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court analyzed the standard for the
insanity defense that it adopted in terms of its causal element: "The rule contains a requirement of causality, as is clear
from the term 'result.' Exculpation is established not by mental disease alone but only if 'as a result' defendant lacks the
substantial capacity required for responsibility." Id.
95. Amsrot.E, Metaphysics, in THE BASIC Wopxs or: ARISronTE 689, 693 (R. McKeon ed. 1941). According to
Aristotle,
[Clauses are spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. the essence (for the 'why' is
reducible finally to the definition, and the ultimate 'why' is a cause and principle); in another the matter or
substratum, in a third the source of change, and in the fourth the cause opposed to this, the purpose and the good
(for this is the end of all generation and change).
Id. at 693. See generally R. SoRAan, NEcF.ssrrY, CAUSE AND BLAME (1980).
96. P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND: A STUDY OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 10-I1
(1958).
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Thus, with the exception of the product and irresistible impulse tests for insanity,
adopted by only a minority of jurisdictions,97 the psychiatrist is not asked to explain
the causes of a person's action. Rather, the psychiatric expert is asked whether the
defendant suffered from a mental disease and, if so, how that disease is likely to have
affected the defendant's ability to understand what he was doing or to control his
conduct.98 The jury is given responsibility for determining whether, as a result of
mental illness, the defendant lacked understanding, appreciation, or control in his
behavior to a degree that he should not be held culpable. 99 The ultimate issue is
whether the defendant lacked the malicious intent or guilty mind that is a condition
for blame and for the just imposition of criminal punishment. ' 0 0
The second way, according to Winslade and Ross, in which the insanity defense
undermines the concept of individual responsibility is the manner in which it encour-
ages empathetic feelings or identification of shared "dark impulses" by the jurors
with the accused.'O Purportedly, the insanity plea creates a situation whereby the
jurors inappropriately identify with the defendant:
We are then free to find some part of ourselves in their story: the anger we would have
felt ... the rage we would have had to control ... the agony we would have en-
dured .... We can imagine the rage, anger, hopelessness, and bitterness that such
situations call forth in humans. We would not act upon those feelings ourselves, of course.
We would control them and act within the stem and clear requirements of duty, hope, and
the perfectibility of our intentions. But we see that there are others who do not, and
perhaps cannot, accept the yoke of those requirements.'
02
97. See G. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 89 (reporting that eleven states employ an irresistible impulse test to
supplement other insanity test formulations and two states, Maine and New Hampshire, have adopted the product test
formulation).
98. See, e.g., H. GOULETr, THE INSANrrY DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1965). This textbook for the trial lawyer
gives the following admonition:
Principally, the examiner must understand clearly that he is not to determine the abstract ability of the accused to
know right from wrong, or abstract ability to refrain from committing criminal acts. The law wants to know
whether the defendant knew at the time of the offense that the particular act was wrong (M'Naghten) and
whether he was able to refrain from committing the crime charged (irresistible impulse). If the answer is
negative there must be a mental disease which deprived the defendant of the requisite intellectual or volitional
faculties.
Id. at 53-54.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F•2d 969, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court described the functions of
psychiatric experts and juries under the Model Penal Code test for insanity as follows:
The rule contemplating expert testimony as to the existence and consequence of a mental disease or defect is not
to be construed as permission to testify solely in terms of expert conclusions. Our jurisprudence to the contrary
is not undone, it is rather underscored. It is the responsibility of all concerned-expert, counsel and judge--to
see to it that the jury in an insanity case is informed of the expert's underlying reasons and approach, and is not
confronted with ultimate opinions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis ...
• . . The jury will consider this testimony under the instruction or need to acquit if as a result of mental
disease or defect there is a lack of substantial capacity to control the behavior in question (or appreciate its
wrongfulness). We think this sufficiently communicates to the jury the kind of hard question it is called upon to
decide, and the instructions will make clear that the jury is not foreclosed by opinions of experts. The experts
add to perspective, without governing decision. The law looks to the experts for input, and to the jury for
outcome.
Id.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
101. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 5-6.
102. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
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According to the authors, such "humanistic concerns"' 0 3 have two adverse con-
sequences. First, jury decisions, as a result of compassion, are not based on legal
rules or even medical facts, but on a sense of fairness; the authors maintain that
presenting a jury with the need to consider an insanity plea necessarily leads to an
unprincipled decision:
When a jury faces such a question, what often becomes a "satisfying" (at least to the
jury) conclusion is not careful application of either legal definitions or psychiatric ex-
pertise. Rather, given all available information, attitudes, and insights, the jury de-
termines what seems to them at the moment asfair-what, in essence, reflects the jury's
feeling that their decision provides balance to the competing claims. 104
The second adverse consequence is that recognizing the validity of the insanity plea
undermines one's sense of responsibility. By eliminating the insanity defense, Win-
slade and Ross maintain that society can "even contribute to an enduring sense of our
own commitment to duty, allegiance to hope, and belief in the perfectibility of our
own intentions." 
0 5
The argument that the insanity defense undermines the concept of personal
responsibility is a complete inversion of the usual understanding of the significance of
the defense that is given by standard texts. For example, Herbert Fingarette, in The
Meaning of Criminal Insanity, 10 6 writes: "[W]here there is insanity, one may prop-
erly speak of irrationality. . . .[W]here rationality is lacking, responsibility status is
lacking. "107 Similarly, Abraham Goldstein writes in The Insanity Defense:'0 8
IT]he insanity defense can play a part in reinforcing the sense of obligation or responsibil-
ity. Its emphasis on whether an offender is sick or bad helps to keep alive the almost
forgotten drama of individual responsibility. Its weight is felt through the tremendous
appeal it holds for the popular imagination, as that imagination is gripped by a dramatic
trial and as the public at large identifies with the man in the dock. In this way, it becomes
a part of a complex of cultural forces that keep alive the moral lessons, and the myths,
which are essential to the continued order of society.'
0 9
Not only does the authors' claim depart from the conventional view that the
insanity defense contributes to the reinforcement of the concept of responsibility, but
their argument also seems flawed both in its premises about the defense and in its
assessment of how the jury operates. The discussion of empathy and identification
with the dark impulses of the defendant does not describe the nature of the insanity
defense or the process of reasoning undergone by jurors who are required to consider
the defense. It seems, rather, that what Winslade and Ross describe is the operation
of a defense based on provocation, which recognizes that human beings may in fact
capitulate to strong emotions and lose control when they can and should exercise
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id. at IS (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 19-20.
106. H. FiNGARETTE. TIlm MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972).
107. Id. at 182.
108. A. GOLDSTEIN, TIlE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967).
109. Id. at 224.
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restraint and control." The insanity defense, on the other hand, does not create a
situation in which the juror is expected to empathize with the emotional reaction of a
defendant; instead, it involves a situation in which the defendant, because of mental
illness, is so different from other persons that he is incapable of rational conduct and,
as a consequence, cannot meet the standards established for responsibility that are
requisites for blame and criminal guilt. "'
Another complaint made by the authors about the operation of the insanity
defense is that the insanity plea leads the jury to base its verdict on a sense of
fairness. 112 It is this exercise of the sense of fairness by the jury within the parameters
of the excuse or defense, however, that provides the basis for the legitimacy of the
insanity defense. This point was given as a ground for the insanity defense by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in its decision in United States v.
Brawner,"3 in which the court, rejecting a "justly responsible" test, adopted an
insanity defense following the Model Penal Code formulation." 4 The Brawner
majority observed:
It is the sense of justice propounded by those charged with making and declaring the
law-legislatures and courts-that lays down the rule that persons without substantial
capacity to know or control the act shall be excused .... There is wisdom in the view that
a jury generally understands well enough that an instruction composed in flexible terms
110. See, e.g., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 64, § 76. LaFave and Scott describe the concept of
reasonable provocation as follows:
It is sometimes stated that, in order to reduce an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter, the provocation
involved must be such as to cause a reasonable man to kill. Yet the reasonable man, however greatly provoked
he may be, does not kill . . . . What is really meant by "reasonable provocation" is provocation which causes a
reasonable man to lose his normal self-control; and, although a reasonable man who has thus lost control over
himself would not kill, yet his homicidal reaction to provocation is at least understandable. Therefore, one who
reacts to the provocation by killing his provoker should not be guilty of murder. But neither should he be guilty
of no crime at all.
Id. at 573.
111. SeeJ. FEINBERG, What Is So Special About Mental Illness, in DOING AND DESERVING 272-92 (1970). Professor
Feinberg attempts to identify what there is about the insane person that sets him apart from other persons who are held
responsible for their conduct. Feinberg concludes that the basis for differentiating the insane actor rests on the bases or the
"why" of his actions:
lIt is a matter] not with the criminal's intentions, but with his underlying motivations-the basis of the appeal in
his immediate goals or objectives. The first such difference is that the sick criminal's motives appear quite
unintelligible to us. 'We sometimes express our puzzlement by saying that his crimes have no apparent motive at
all. We cannot see any better than the criminal himself "what he gets out of it," and it overburdens our
imaginative faculties to put ourselves in his shoes. We understand the avaricious, irascible, or jealous man's
motives all too well, and we resent him for them. But where the crimes resist explanation in terms of ordinary
motives, we hardly know what to resent. Here the old maxim "to understand all is to forgive all" seems to be
turned on its ear. It is closer to the truth to say of mentally ill wrongdoers that to forgive is to despair of
understanding.
•.. We get closer to the heart of the matter, I think, if we say that the mentally ill criminal's motives are
unintelligible because they are irrational-not just unreasonable, but irrational.
Id. at 284-85 (emphasis in original).
112. Ttm INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 18.
113. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
114. The "justly responsible" test was recommended by the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.
Final Report, Cmd. 8932 at 98 (1953), as an alternative to the Model Penal Code test, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01
(Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955). It was also recommended in Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion in United States v. Brawner. 471
F.2d 969, 1010-39 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This test has been adopted by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See State v. Johnson. 399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979).
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gives it sufficient latitude so that, without disregarding the instruction, it can provide that
application of the instruction which harmonizes with its sense of justice .... 5
This fact, instead of undermining a sense of personal responsibility in the public,
contributes to and reinforces that sense. The function of the insanity defense is
recognized to be one of distinguishing "the responsible from the irresponsible," thus
reinforcing the concept of responsibility in those who will be held to account for their
conduct."t 6 The central significance of the insanity defense is the separation of
nonblameworthy from blameworthy offenders. Thus, the defense of insanity has the
purpose of maintaining the requisites of individual moral and legal responsibility by
identifying those qualities which lead to moral and legal accountability. The insanity
defense has as its very foundation the concept of individual responsibility as a prereq-
uisite for criminal culpability and penal sanction.
B. Case Studies
While The Insanity Plea provides general argumentation for abolition of the
insanity defense, the main body of the book consists of seven cases that the authors
admit are not necessarily "representative of the insanity defense cases submitted to
jurors throughout the United States," but were chosen because each "represents one
aspect of the problems inherent in the insanity defense."" 7 Because the ultimate
conclusions and recommendations of the authors rest primarily on the account and
analysis given these cases, the authors' discussion of each case merits close scrutiny.
1. Dan White
The first case chosen is that of Dan White, who was charged with two counts of
first degree murder under California law for the killing of the mayor and a city
supervisor of San Francisco."l 8 White's trial resulted in a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter on both counts. "9 The opinion of Winslade and Ross is that "[t]he case
of Dan White shows how psychiatrists play upon jurors' emotions by offering testi-
mony that explains behavior in compassionate psychobiographical form and provides
an excuse for reduced responsibility."' 20
In one sense, the authors' choice of the case of Dan White as the first case in
which to examine the deficiencies of the insanity plea is surprising, since White did
not rely on the insanity defense but instead used a diminished capacity defense.' 2'
115. 471 F.2d 969. 988 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
116. Kadish. The Decline of Innocence. 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 287 (1968).
117. Tim INSANITY PLEA. supra note 45, at 201.
118. Id. at 21-51. For a general account of this case, see Er-Official Guilty of Manslaughter in Slayings on Coast;
3.000 Protest, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1979, at Al, col. I [hereinafter cited as Er-Official Guilyr.
119. TilE INSANIT PLEA, supra note 45, at 25.
120. Id. at 201.
121. Id. at 26. The defense of diminished capacity or partial responsibility should be distinguished from the insanity
defense. See HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW. supra note 64. § 43. at 326-31. LaFave and Scott observe that the two
defenses should be differentiated in terms of their consequences:
It must be emphasized that the notion of partial responsibility is quite separate and distinct from the defense of
insanity. If a successful insanity defense is interposed, the result is a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity
and. usually, commitment of the defendant. By contrast, an appropriate showing of partial responsibility will
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The defense of diminished capacity is recognized in only a minority of juris-
dictions. 122 It was broadly construed in California 123 until the White case, after which
the California legislature attempted to eliminate the defense by statute. 124 In another
sense, the authors' choice of this case is not surprising, since the case involved
political assassination and is thus precisely the type of case that is most reported by
result in a finding of not guilty of the offense charged, although the circumstances will usually be such that
conviction of some lesser offense is still possible. The ultimate result, then, is not commitment but rather a
sentence of imprisonment following conviction of an offense carrying lesser penalties than the crime originally
charged.
Id. § 43, at 326. Furthermore, where the two defenses have been recognized, their acceptance has reflected an understand-
ing of fundamentally distinct theoretical bases for the two defenses. LaFave and Scott report:
ITlhose jurisdictions which have accepted the notion that evidence of an abnormal mental condition may be
considered on the issue whether the defendant had the mental state required for the offense charged have
typically done so by emphasizing the difference between partial responsibility and the insanity defense. Because
the various tests for insanity as a defense do not of necessity require a determination of defendant's ability to
have the specific mental state defined for the offense charged, there is no inconsistency in the conclusion that a
defendant undeserving of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity might nonetheless have lacked the mental
state. For example, if such a defendant is charged with first degree murder, thus calling for the prosecution to
prove that the killing was committed with premeditation and deliberation, evidence tending to show that the
defendant did not premeditate or deliberate because of a mental abnormality remains most relevant.
id. § 43, at 327.
122. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968) (providing a compilation of case and statutory law in which the defense
of diminished capacity has been recognized). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 comment (1980):
Very few jurisdictions allow mental disease or defect to reduce intentional homicide to manslaughter. Tradi-
tionally, such mitigation arises only from the rule of provocation. As the earlier discussion makes clear.
provocation has been a predominantly objective determination . . . . It seeks to identify cases of intentional
homicide where the situation is as much to blame as the actor. Recognizing diminished responsibility as an
alternative ground for reducing murder to manslaughter undermines the scheme. Unlike provocation, di-
minished responsibility is entirely subjective in character .. . . It recognizes the defendant's own mental
disorder or emotional instability as a basis for partially excusing his conduct. This position undoubtedly
achieves a closer relation between criminal liability and moral guilt .. . .But this approach has its costs. By
evaluating the abnormal individual on his own terms, it decreases the incentives for him to behave as if he were
normal .. . .And the factors that call for mitigation under this doctrine are the very aspects of an individual's
personality that makes us fearful of his future conduct. In short, diminished responsibility brings formal guilt
more closely into line with moral blameworthiness, but only at the cost of driving a wedge between dangerous-
ness and social control.
123. Under the California diminished capacity defense, two distinct grounds were developed for establishing the
defense. The first, which is the sole ground in most other states that recognize the defense, is that psychological evidence
is admissible to establish that the defendant lacked capacity, as a result of mental illness, to maintain a requisite mental
state. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716.336 P.2d 492 (1959).
overruled, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978). In People v. Conley. 64 Cal.
2d 310, 411 P.2d 911. 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966), overruled, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318. 583 P.2d 1308. 149 Cal.
Rptr. 265 (1978), the California Supreme Court held evidence of impairment of the defendant's mental capacity admis-
sible to negate any particular state of mind. A second ground, unique to California, provided that evidence of mental
disorder was admissible to show lack of a culpable mental state by showing that the defendant lacked full appreciation of
the moral significance of his conduct. In Conley the California court held, "A person who intentionally kills may be
incapable of harboring malice aforethought because of a mental disease, defect, or intoxication, and in such case his
killing, unless justified or excused, is voluntary manslaughter." 64 Cal. 2d 310, 318, 411 P.2d 911. 916, 49 Cal. Rptr.
815, 820 (1966), overruled, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308. 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978). See also
People v. Wolf, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). The Wolfcourt recognized the relevance of "the
quantum of personal turpitude of the offenders" as an issue raised by evidence of mental disorder. The court concluded.
"In the case at bench there is no question that the defendant had the intent to kill; but the mental infirmity of this defendant
presents a very serious problem as to the quantum of his personal turpitude and depravity as inherently related to the
degree of the murder." Id. at 820, 394 P.2d at 975. 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (Vest Supp. 1983) provides:
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice as
defined above, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither
an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such
awareness is . . . included within the definition of malice.
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the media and that, the research studies show, leads to the greatest public hostility to
the defense and produces erroneous public opinion about the incidence and signifi-
cance of the defense. 2 5 The verdict in the White case was viewed by some as both
evidence of jury prejudice and a reflection of homophobia directed toward one of the
victims, who was a prominent public figure in the San Francisco homosexual com-
munity. 126 The special quality of this public opposition and the extreme reaction of
the public in protest demonstrations' 27 suggest that this is not the best case with
which to dispassionately evalute the insanity defense.
Winslade and Ross contend that the verdict in the Dan White case was the result
of two factors: the jury's empathy with the defendant 128 and the psychiatric expert
witnesses' attribution of crime to psychological forces. 129 The authors assert:
[Wihat seems most likely to explain the jury's surprising verdict is that they found Dan
White an extremely sympathetic figure, and not the least because he was so ex-
traordinarily American in his simplistic views of what the world was like .... It is
impossible to believe that twelve ordinary jurors would have refused to find White guilty
of either first- or second-degree murder if they had not had the psychiatric "scientific"
explanation to fall back on.13
0
The jury was presented with a case in which it was asked, under the law then
existing in California, whether the defendant was guilty of murder. Murder was
defined as "[t]he unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." 131 If
the killing was a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing," it would be first
degree murder; otherwise it would be second degree murder.' 32 Both degrees of
murder required "malice" manifested by "a deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow creature." 133 Moreover, by judicial construction, "malice"
required that the defendant have an ability "to comprehend his duty to govern his
actions in accord with the duty imposed by law. "' 34 The diminished capacity defense
required that the jury consider evidence of mental disorder as possibly negating the
capacity to deliberate and to premeditate, and if the jurors found that this capacity
was lacking, they were precluded from finding first degree murder. In addition, the
jury was required to determine whether the evidence showed that the mental disorder
prevented the defendant from having the capacity to act with malice, and if the jurors
found that this capacity was lacking, they were precluded from entering a verdict of
second degree murder.'
35
125. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
126. See Er.Official Guilty. supra note 118, at Al, col. 1. It was reported. "Earlier, Harry Britt. a homosexual
appointed by Mayor Feinstein to succeed Mr. Milk, said, 'This insane jury has legitimatized the immorality of this killer.
Every gay will know that this man's act represented intense homophobia.' Id. at D17, col. 2.
127. Id. at Al. col. 1. reporting, "'Within an hour after the verdict was announced, an angry mob of about 3,000
demonstrators marched to City Hall. where they surged against the front doors, breaking panes of glass."
128. TitE INSANtry DEF NSE. supra note 45, at 44-50.
129. Id. at 44-48.
130. Id. at 50.
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
132. Id. § 189.
133. Id. § 188.
134. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). overruled, People v. Wetmore, 22
Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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As Winslade and Ross correctly report, evidence from a number of prominent
psychiatric witnesses demonstrated that the defendant was mentally disordered-that
the defendant suffered from depression.' 36 For example, Dr. Donald Lunde, a pro-
fessor of psychiatry and a lecturer in law at Stanford University, testified: "In Mr.
White's case, he not only did not premeditate or deliberate these killings, but as a
result of his mental condition, he was not capable of any kind of mature, meaningful
reflection [at the time of the killings]." 137 However, as reported in The New York
Times (but not mentioned by Winslade and Ross), the jury deliberated on its verdict
for thirty-six hours during six days. 138 There does not seem to be any reason to doubt
that the jury considered both the law and evidence in the case before reaching its
verdict. Rather than ascribing the jury's decision merely to empathy or undue def-
erence to psychiatric experts, one should consider the possibility that the jury reached
its verdict by carefully considering all the evidence. The verdict was surely con-
troversial, but it was not clearly erroneous given the law and the evidence.
Winslade and Ross fail to mention one important fact in their discussion of the
White case: first degree murder in California carried a possible sentence of death. '39
This fact may have influenced the jury, and it seems to have influenced the California
courts in developing the doctrine of diminished capacity. In the White case, the
prosecutor sought the death penalty. 14' Therefore, if one is seeking to explain the
jury's verdict on some ground other than the law and evidence, a likely ground is that
the jury believed that the death penalty was too harsh a penalty for the killings
because of the mental and emotional state of the defendant.
2. Prosenjit Poddar
The second illustrative case is that of Prosenjit Poddar, who was charged with
the murder of Tatiana (Tanya) Tarasoff. 141 Poddar pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity. The jury, however, returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder and
found the defendant sane at the time of the commission of the crime.' 42 The facts,
which are extensively reviewed by Winslade and Ross and reported in two court
opinions, 143 are that Poddar, a college student from Bengal, India, fell in love with
and became obsessed by the deceased, whom he eventually shot when she rebuffed
136. TiE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 46-47.
137. Id. at 46.
138. £r-Official Guilty. supra note 118, at D17, col. 2.
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1970) provides that murder of the first degree is punishable by death when
special enumerated circumstances exist.
140. See Ex-Official Guilty, supra note 118, at D17, col. 4, where it was reported:
The prosecutor asked for a finding that the killings constituted first-degree murder with "special circum-
stances," which would permit the death penalty under terms of a capital punishment law adopted in a statewide
referendum last November.
The "special circumstances" cited were that Mayor Moscone had been killed to block an official action-
naming another person to the seat Mr. White had resigned but wanted back-and that more than one person had
been killed.
141. THE INSANrrY PLEA, supra note 45, at 52-73.
142. See People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 753, 518 P.2d 342, 344, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 912 (1974).
143. Id.; People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal, Ct. App. 1972), vacated, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111
Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974).
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his advances. The defense produced three psychiatrists and one psychologist who
testified that the defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic who could not have har-
bored malice aforethought at the time of the killing, and the prosecution produced a
court-appointed psychiatrist who testified that the defendant was merely schizoid and
could harbor the requisite mental state for murder.'" The defendant appealed and
obtained a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing
to give a requested instruction relating the effect of diminished capacity to implied
malice, which was an element of second degree murder.145 Thus, this case is ul-
timately one of diminished capacity under California law and not an insanity defense
case, at least in its appellate treatment.
The use of this case by the authors to examine the operation and claimed
deficiencies of the insanity defense seems less motivated by a desire to instruct the
reader than by a desire to provide a rhetorical argument on the need to fix guilt and
responsibility for harm. Winslade and Ross assert, "The judicial system intervened
in this case to try to improve upon the trial court's allocation of guilt and responsibil-
ity. Their efforts were rough and, in the long run, counterproductive, because no one
was found guilty and no one was held responsible." 146 The authors' ultimate assess-
ment is that "[t]he Poddar case shows the ability of the judiciary to use technical
points of law to overturn jury verdicts when their assessment of the defendant's
mental state differs from the jury's opinion." 147
The authors' rhetorical strategy merits scrutiny. First, this case does not support
the claim that the insanity defense establishes a means for relieving guilty persons of
responsibility, since the jury in fact rejected the insanity defense. Second, the asser-
tion that this case reveals judicial efforts to displace the jury's findings of responsibil-
ity is false 148 since the basis of the reversal was not a finding of a clearly erroneous
jury verdict, but an error on the part of the trial court in failing to give a proper
instruction.
Like the Dan White case, Poddar involved legal issues peculiar to the law of
diminished capacity in California at the time of the Poddar trial. One need only
examine the text of the opinion of the California Supreme Court to determine the
precise gound of the reversal. The court reasoned as follows:
Our inquiry in the instant case is particularly directed to the propriety of the jury's finding
of implied malice in light of diminished capacity....
* * " The question of the existence of a diminished capacity was clearly a disputed
factual issue and defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on its applicability to
the issue of implied malice. The failure to give instructions thereon would thus have been
error ....
144. 10 Cal. 3d 750. 754, 518 P.2d 342. 345, 11 Cal. Rptr. 910, 913 (1974).
145. Id. at 753, 518 P.2d at 344, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
146. TIE INSANITY PLEA. supra note 45, at 72.
147. Id. at 201.
148. Id. at 70. The claim is that "sympathy and empathy for Poddar may well have led [the court) to make this
unlikely reversal." Id.
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... The vice of the instructions, however, is that they stopped short of being full
and complete and failed to advise as to the precise finding or findings, after a threshold
finding of a diminished capacity, which must be made prior to a determination that
defendant acted with malice aforethought. 4 9
The court concluded:
We have little difficulty in concluding that the error was prejudicial. Defendant's whole
defense was, essentially, his failure to have entertained mental intents which were neces-
sary elements of the crimes charged or included in the charges. Evidence was introduced
which was almost overwhelming that by reason of diminished capacity defendant lacked
malice aforethought. Under the facts of the instant case we conclude that in the absence of
the error it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have
been reached. 150
While Winslade and Ross could have developed a principled critique of di-
minished capacity, they chose not to do so.' 5 1 Rather, they criticize the court's
decision as resting on "an unlikely technical issue." 152 More significant than the
rhetorical devices adopted is the revelation of the authors' basic premise underlying
not only their comments on Poddar, but also their view of the insanity defense.
Winslade and Ross rhetorically ask, "Is the question of Poddar's state of mind really
relevant to his guilt?" 153 The authors' notion of guilt is one of causal responsibility; it
is not the concept of guilt that entails blame and that has come to be a basic requisite
for criminal liability in Anglo-American law.' 54 Winslade and Ross seem obsessed
with fixing guilt or responsibility for criminal harm, and this obsession leads them to
view subsequent litigation stemming from Poddar, in which the Tarasoff family
sought civil relief from police and from physicians treating Poddar, 55 as a "quest for
legal responsibility in the murder of Tanya Tarasoff.' ' 156 The authors' despair in
finding that no legal authority imposed penal or civil penalities on anyone related to
the case leads them to complain: "No one was found guilty, no one was found
responsible, and no one was found to have failed in any duty they might have had to
prevent Tanya's sad death." 157 Their frustration is also expressed in the conclusion:
"This was a murder [that] ends by being a death with no reason and no
responsibility." 158
149. 10 Cal. 3d 750, 758-59, 518 P.2d 342, 348-49, I11 Cal. Rptr. 910. 916-17 (1974).
150. Id. at 761, 518 P.2d at 350, I11 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
151. See supra text accompanying note 117. See also Johnson. Foreword: The Accidental Decision and How It
Happens. 65 CALIF. L. REV. 231. 239-43 (1977); Morse, Dihtished Capacity: A Moral antd Legal Couatdrum. 2 INT'L
J. L. & PSYCHtOLOGY 271. 281-83 (1979).
152. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 70.
153. Id. at 71.
154. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Chief Judge Bazelon observed. *'Our
collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.")
155. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), opinion on
rehearing, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding that university psychotherapists could be
found liable for failing to wan a person threatened and subsequently murdered by one of the psychotherapists' patients).
See generally Fleming & Maximou, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CtLF. L. REv. 1025 (1974);
Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. REv. 358 (1976); Vexler,
Therapists and Third Parties: The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHrATRY 1 (1979).
156. THE INSANrrY PLEA, supra note 45, at 69.
157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
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The position taken in The Insanity Plea reflects a profound misunderstanding of
criminal law. Certainly there was a killing, but there was no murder unless the
elements established by the penal code were proved. In California this required proof
of malice. 159 Without malice there simply was no murder. Second, it is not the
purpose of the law to assign guilt or responsibility on someone in every case of
criminal harm, nor is it the objective of the law to impose a penalty on someone for
every death, or even for every death that is a result of a killing. The criminal law is
reserved for the imposition of penal sanctions on the culpable. The existence of stated
requisite elements of offenses and the recognition of a series of explicit defenses that
serve to justify or excuse a killing are meant to restrict the finding of criminal guilt
and the imposition of penal sanctions to those who are responsible, in the sense of
being culpable, according to the criteria established by law. The fallacy of the
authors' argument is made clearest in their discussion of the civil cases that led the
California courts to establish a duty on the part of therapists to warn potential victims
of dangerous patients. 160 Winslade and Ross express dismay that the civil actions led
to an out-of-court damage settlement so that "even then, pronouncement of guilt and
apportionment of responsibility was never made."' 61 Certainly it is a strange view
that would consider the lack of a court judgment for damages arising from a duty to
warn potential victims in this circumstance to be a failure of the legal system to
pronounce guilt and apportion responsibility.
Last, the authors' effort to employ Poddar as an occasion to condemn the
insanity defense is totally unsupported by the facts of the case. Winslade and Ross
conclude that the Poddar case is one in which "[t]he jury found him sane; the
Supreme Court [of California] seemed to think him insane."' 62 This mischaracteriza-
tion of the case is revealed in the earlier discussion of the court's opinion, which
shows that the court's concern was clearly centered on the issue of diminished
capacity and that the basis for the appeal was a claim of trial court error in the
instruction of the jury. 163
3. Leonard Smith
The third case analyzed by Winslade and Ross concerned the killing of Lyman
Bostock by Leonard Smith.164 It is the first case in the book to directly and fully
present the issue of the insanity defense. Unfortunately, no legal opinions were
generated by this case, and the only readily available public record is newspaper
reports of the killing.' 65 One is compelled, therefore, to accept the authbrs' account
of the case. Nevertheless, a brief consideration of the authors' evaluation of the facts
they report is valuable since this evaluation is used to support their general arguments
against the insanity defense.
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187-88 (West 1970).
160. TUE INSANITY PLEA. supra note 45. at 68-73.
161. Id. at 71.
162. Id. at 73.
163, See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
164. Titm INSANITY PLEA. supra note 45, at 74-102.
165. See Bostock Is Shot toDeath in Gary. Chicago Tribune. Sept. 24. 1978. at 1. col. 2: Baseball Star Slain: Man
Held. Chicago Tribune. Sept. 25. 1978. at I. col. 4 & 10, col. 4.
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Leonard Smith was charged with killing Lyman Bostock, a well-known baseball
player. Smith did not personally know Bostock, but Smith observed Bostock in the
company of Smith's wife at the time of the killing. 166 Smith was estranged from his
wife, but was in the process of seeking a reconciliation. He was disappointed by
failure not only in marriage but also in employment, and he believed that he was a
victim of racial prejudice. 167 Smith's first trial failed to result in a unanimous verdict,
but at a second trial Smith was found not guilty by reason of insanity. 168 According to
Winslade and Ross, two psychiatrists testified at the first trial; one expressed doubts
about the defendant's sanity, and the other testified that the defendant was sane. '69'At
the second trial an additional expert, a psychologist, testified on the basis of in-
terviews and tests that Smith was insane.' 70 The authors offer snippets of the trial
transcript comprising the judgments that the defendant had "gradually increasing
neurotic difficulties" and that "repeated failures . . . slowly eroded his
functions." 171
Winslade and Ross give two reasons why, in their opinion, the insanity defense
was successful in Smith's case. The first is based on the assertion that the jury
empathized with Smith. To support this contention, the authors first claim that the
jury was touched by the "hard luck story" of the defendant, while it felt alienated
from the success of the deceased. "The jury could not very well identify with
Bostock, but they could with Leonard Smith." 172 This analysis of the way average
jurors think and feel is dubious at best; no evidence suggests that the average Amer-
ican identifies with a person who is a failure and kills rather than with a person who is
successful and is killed. Such a dynamic is certainly not the apparent response of the
average citizen to Mark David Chapman, the killer of John Lennon, or even to John
Hinckley, who attempted to kill President Reagan. The second basis for the claimed
empathy is the acquittal itself: "The first jury's position suggests the incipient sym-
pathy for Leonard Smith. The second jury's verdict confirms it."173 The fallacy of
this reasoning is clear: Winslade and Ross claim that one of the reasons why the
insanity defense is successful is that there is an improper process of empathizing with
the defendant by the jury rather than a determination of guilt or innocence based on
the principles provided in law, and the proof of this assertion is that the defense of
insanity is successful. One could hardly hope to find a better example of a circular
argument.
The second reason for the success of the insanity defense in the Smith case,
according to Winslade and Ross, is the nature of the testimony and evidence pre-
166. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 92-93.
167. Id. at 83-93.
168. Id. at 75-76.
169. Id. at 75-76. The actual diagnoses or bases of the psychiatrists' opinions were not given. Rather, they testified
only about the ultimate issue--a practice currently subject to criticism. See, e.g.. American PsYchiatric Association
Statement on the Insanity Defense, supra note 14, at 683.
170. THE INSANITY PLEA. supra note 45, at 75-76.
171. Id. at 76.
172. id. at 76-77.
173. Id. at 100.
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sented by the psychologist at the second trial.' 74 The authors claim that the witness
"had shown the jurors an objective and apparently scientific guide to Leonard's state
of mind, to an assessment of mental illness and lack of capacity, and to a verdict of
not responsible by reason of insanity."' 7 5 The verdict is again the proof of the claim.
Winslade and Ross reason: "The first trial jury was deadlocked, ten to two for
conviction. The second jury voted twelve to zero for acquittal. The major difference
was a single psychologist who testified that Smith was incapable, because of mental
illness, of forming the required intent for murder."' 76 This reasoning ignores the fact
that the psychologist's testimony was not the only variable in the two trials. Two
different juries were undoubtedly capable of different judgments about the entire
body of evidence in the case; the authors' analysis ignores the possibility of a differ-
ent jury dynamic in the process of deliberation in the two trials. The analysis also
suggests that the jurors simply deferred to one expert witness, ignoring all other
evidence-a judgment contrary to the findings of empirical studies of jury de-
liberations in trials involving the defense of insanity. 177
Winslade and Ross assess the Smith case as follows:
This case is a clear miscarriage of justice and abuse of the insanity plea. It was made
possible by the attorney who pursued it, the psychotherapists who participated in it, and
the jury who bought the sorry bill of goods. The therapist in this case appears to be the
primary perpetrator of the outrageous acquittal, but in fact he is merely someone used by
the legal system to rationalize and dignify verdicts and sentences that otherwise are not
only unjust but unjustifiable. 178
The implications of this judgment are not limited to the impropriety of the insanity
defense; it is an indictment of the jury system itself. The account Winslade and Ross
give of the Smith case is simply insufficient to support their condemnation of the
insanity defense, the asserted lack of conscientiousness on the part of the jury, or the
impropriety of the verdict. Most certainly the authors' parting comment on the Smith
case goes beyond any fair reading of the case even by their account: "In effect, the
criminal justice system told Leonard Smith he could have one almost-free murder to
make up for his sad life. That was no bargain-and no justice-for anyone." 179 The
rhetorical style of this discourse cannot substitute for principled analysis, empirical
study, or dispassionate evaluation. One is compelled to conclude that Winslade and
Ross seek not to instruct, but to persuade.
4. Tex Watson
The fourth case discussed by Winslade and Ross is that of Charles "Tex"
Watson,' 80 who was convicted of seven counts of first degree murder and one count
174. Id. at 97 ("He had tests, he had test scores, he had scientific profiles. It was just a matter of demonstrating
psychological facts.").
175. Id. at 99.
176. Id. at 100 (emphasis in original).
177. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
178. Th INsANrTY PLtu, supra note 45, at 100-01.
179. Id. at 102.
180. Id. at 103-32.
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of conspiracy to commit murder' 8' growing out of the Tate and LaBianca slayings,
popularly known as the Manson murders. 182 This case is used by Winslade and Ross
chiefly to criticize the nature and presentation of psychiatric evidence at trial. One
important fact not mentioned in the book is that this proceeding, which is described at
length, included a separate sanity hearing under a bifurcated trial procedure mandated
under California law.' 83 This procedure required first a determination of guilt, and
then separate hearings on sanity and penalty.' 84 Therefore, the authors' suggestion
that the psychiatric evidence was disregarded by the jury in its determination of guilt
is misleading. Winslade and Ross assert, "IT]he juries returned verdicts containing
not even the slightest suggestion that they thought these murderers were insane ....
All the defendants were found guilty"; 185 and claim "[A court-appointed psychi-
atrist] gave the jury a set of reasons and motivations that they could understand and
that they could use to support a guilty verdict."' 186 Actually, the jurors already had
concluded the guilt phase of the trial before they heard the psychiatric testimony
related to the insanity defense.
While the main focus of the discussion of the Watson case in The Insani, Plea
is a critique of the psychiatric expert testimony, several other unsupported or mislead-
ing points are suggested. In almost symmetrical opposition to their characterization of
the process at work in the Smith case, the authors suggest that the jury's guilty verdict
and rejection of the insanity plea in the Watson case is explained, in part, by lack of
empathy with or sympathy for the defendant: "The jury had to make some sense both
of the murders and murderers, but how was it possible to understand something so
horrendous? The choices seemed limited: either these young people were crazy
.I .or they were monsters . . . and not at all like other people."' 87 Fear is the
authors' ultimate explanation for the verdicts in the case: "[Watson] was dangerous
and they gave him the death sentence. Was he crazy? Did it really matter to the jury?
To society? No jury would have sent him anywhere but death row. They didn't want
to ever see him on the streets again."'' 88 Winslade and Ross refuse to consider the
possibility that maybe, just maybe, the jury considered the law and evidence in the
case and reached a just and justified verdict.
181. See Watson Convicted of Tate Murders; Faces Sanity Trial, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1971. at 17. col. I
[hereinafter cited as Watson Convicted].
182. See generally V. BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER: TIE TRUE STORY OF THE MANSON MURDERS
(1977) [hereinafter cited as HELTER SKELTER]: G. BisitOp. WITNESS TO EVIL: TIlE INSIDE STORY OF TiE TATE/LABIANCA
MURDER TRIAL (1971); E. SANDERS, THE FAMILY (1972). A useful collection of papers presenting an examination of the
philosophical implications of this case, significant for consideration of the justification for the insanity defense, is
presented in TilE MANSON MURDERS: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (D. Cooper ed. 1974).
183. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1970).
184. Id. Watson Convicted. supra note 181. at 17, col. 1, reported, "The six-man, six-woman jury that convicted
Watson deliberated for five days .... He still faces a sanity trial and if ruled sane, a trial to determine whether the
penalty should be life imprisonment or death." See HELTER SKELTER, supra note 182, at 463, where the prosecuting
attorney reports. "Charles 'Tex' Watson went on trial in August 1971 .... The trial had three possible phases-guilt.
sanity, and penalty-each of which presented its own problems."
185. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 105.
186. Id. at 114.
187. Id. at 106 (emphasis in original).
188. Id. at 132.
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Two other red herrings are tossed into the discussion of the Watson case.
Winslade and Ross suggest that the character of the crime, rather than the capacities
of the defendant, can be determinative of insanity and that the bizarre quality of the
killings in the Watson case indicates that a finding of insanity was rejected by the jury
for deep-seated psychological reasons such as fear. The authors remark, "The stories
of the murders gave sufficient detail to suggest that, if any murder could be charac-
terized as an act of insanity, then surely these could."' 189 If a showing of a bizarre
manner of performing a killing was the basis for an insanity defense, one could
expect the most rational and calculating person to go free since he would most
assuredly develop a plan of killing that could meet the standards of insane crime. The
insanity defense, however, is concerned with the culpability of the actor, not the
characteristics of his crime, except as these characteristics provide a basis for in-
ference about his capacities.
A second misleading suggestion made in The Insanity Plea is that drug use
provides a sufficient basis for the insanity defense. Winslade and Ross write, "But
when a vast amount of drug use was reported in the Manson and Watson trials, the
jury forgot that drugs make you crazy and did not for a second believe that drug
craziness was a defense."' 90 Of course, "drug craziness" is not a defense. Actual
drug intoxication at the time of an offense may negate a requisite mental state, and
excessive use of drugs may bring about insanity by producing brain damage, but in
the latter case the legal rules concerning the insanity defense govern.'
9 1
The principal use of the Watson trial in criticizing the insanity defense is for
"demonstrat[ing] the disarray, vagueness, and confused, conflicting opinions of
psychiatrists.' ' 192 Here Winslade and Ross make a number of valid points. They
identify three principal reasons for the conflict in psychiatric evidence. First, the
"adversary aspect of criminal trials accounts for some of the disparity in evidence
given by expert psychiatric witnesses." 193 This certainly is true, but this objection is
directed at the adversarial system, not the nature of psychiatric testimony. As Alan
Stone, professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard University and former president of
the American Psychiatric Association, has noted:
Whatever the scientific status of psychiatry may be and whatever the ethical status of its
practitioners may be, the public has to expect that psychiatrists, like all other expert
witnesses, have been selected by lawyers who are advocates. Furthermore, in all impor-
tant cases, the lawyer will have screened and then coached the psychiatrist on what to say
and how to say it. To object to the contradictory testimony of psychiatrists is to object to
the adversarial system of justice. 194
189. Id. at 105.
190. id.
191. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw. supra note 64, § 45. at 341-51.
192. TIE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 201.
193, Id. at 121.
194. Stone. supra note 12, at 638 (emphasis added). The alternative to adversarial presentation of psychiatric
testimony is to provide for a court-appointed expert; this would, however, have the likely effect of usurping the
fact-finding responsibility ofjudge orjury. See Prelinger. supra note 12. at 238-39. Prelinger evaluates an approach using
court-appointed psychiatric expert witnesses as follows:
It has been suggested that "impartial." perhaps court-appointed mental-health experts, either individually or as
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Winslade and Ross do not limit their explanation of the conflicts in psychiatric
testimony to the effect of the adversarial system. They maintain that these conflicts
are inevitable because between law and psychiatry there is "an absolute difference in
assumptions or in basic beliefs about human functioning."' 195 In addition, they
observe, "Psychotherapeutic expert witnesses are members of a profession that has
no generally agreed upon, scientifically based standard of knowledge with respect to
the issues of insanity and legal responsibility." 196 Finally, Winslade and Ross argue
that, beyond the inherent inadequacies of psychiatric evidence, it is impossible to
make an assessment of a past state of mind; concerning the Watson case, they
maintain: "No one there knew nor had any way of knowing what his state of mind
had been on the night of the murders. We simply don't know enough to uncover that
kind of knowledge."' 97 Ultimately, Winslade and Ross argue that the criminal trial
would be improved by eliminating psychiatric testimony: "Tex Watson, the jury, and
the public would all have been better served if the [psychiatric] experts had declined
to testify."' 98
The authors' argument, particularly their objection to psychiatric opinion as
conclusive proof of a past state of mind, has some strength. Psychiatric testimony
should be offered as relevant evidence to be considered by the jury, along with all
other evidence presented as a basis for the jurors' factual determination of the de-
fendant's capacity and responsibility. Moreover, the authors' critique of the subjec-
tive quality of unsupported opinion testimony by some psychiatric witnesses has
some merit. The proper response, however, is reform of the rules controlling the pre-
sentation of evidence, not the elimination of psychiatric testimony.' 99 Every legal
formulation of the insanity test requires as one of its elements a showing of mental
disease or defect. 2° Psychiatrists are by definition experts in the diagnosis of the
existence of mental disease, and it is absurd to think that one could maintain the
specially constituted boards, possibly augmented by a member chosen by the defendant, might evaluate the
accused and present their findings for consideration of judge or juries. This proposal carries the risk of such
consultants in actuality usurping the functions of judge or jury and thus in effect deciding the case.
Id.
195. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 123.
196. Id. at 108.
197. Id. at 129.
198. Id. at 131.
199. See Prelinger. supra note 12. Prelinger suggests that certain evidence is less likely to involve opinion and give
rise to conflicts among psychiatric witnesses:
lit is obvious that material of an "objective" nature carries most weight. This includes, predominantly, easily
verified life-historical data, especially those reflecting a history of pathological conduct. Psychological test
results, particularly if derived from well-known, standardized instruments, similarly are less likely to be so
intensely disputed during cross-examination as more remote and indirectly derived inferences and in-
terpretations may be.
Id. at 239. Prelinger then suggests restrictions on the admission of psychiatric testimony: "'The role of expert witness
would be redefined as that of a provider of facts, observations, and qualified inference and opinion." Id. at 240.
200. The M'Naghten test requires as an element of the defense of insanity that "the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718. 722 (H.L. 1843). The
Durham product test provided in part, "if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled, United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972). The Model Penal Code test includes the qualification, "i]f at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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insanity defense and eliminate psychiatric testimony. As Alan Stone has observed,
"[I]f there is to be an insanity defense, there must be psychiatric testimony or some
equivalent . 201
5. Robert Torsney
The fifth case presented in The Insanity Plea is that of Robert Torsney,2 °2 an
on-duty New York City police officer at the time of the alleged offense, who was
charged with second degree murder for the killing of a black youth.2 3 Evidence
showed that Torsney fired his weapon without provocation or justification at point-
blank range. 204 The defendant admitted the killing, but contended that he was not
criminally responsible.2 0 5 Psychiatric witnesses presented by the prosecution main-
tained that Torsney suffered from hysterical tendencies, but was not psychotic.
20 6
Defense witnesses claimed that the defendant was neurotic, possibly had brain dam-
age, and suffered from a psychomotor seizure caused by a rare form of epilepsy
called "Automatism of Penfield. "207 The jury found Torsney not guilty by reason of
insanity. Winslade and Ross correctly report that the killing and the jury's verdict met
with criticism from the public, which saw implicit overtones of racial bias in the
killing and acquittal.20 8
The authors' critique of the operation of the insanity defense and the nature and
the quality of psychiatric testimony in Torsney parallels their discussion of the other
cases in The Insanity Plea. The focus of their analysis of the Torsney case is the
post-acquittal disposition of the defendant.
Winslade and Ross report that Torsney was commited to a psychiatric evaluation
center after his acquittal and then transferred to a mental hospital for diagnosis and
treatment.2 0 9 Within four months, the treating physicians found that Torsney was not
dangerous and not mentally ill and recommended that he be released. 2 '0 After a series
of reviews by a special release committee, an independent review panel, and the
Commissioner of Mental Health, and a full evidentiary hearing before a trial court
lasting for nine days, the court ordered Torsney released on the conditions that he not
carry a gun, not continue as a police officer, and continue treatment as an out-
patient. 2 1 1 The appellate division reversed the release order, finding that the evidence
failed to establish that Torsney was ready for conditional release without danger to
201. Stone. supra note 12, at 640.
202. TnE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45. at 133-58.
203. See hi re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262. 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, rev'g 66 A.D.2d 281,412 N.Y.S.2d
914 (1979).
204. Id. at 686, 394 N.E.2d at 273. 420 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
205, Id.
206. Id. at 677, 394 N.E.2d at 268, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
207. Id. at 691, 394 N.E.2d at 276, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 207; see THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45. at 140-41.
208. TnE INSANrn" PLEA. supra note 45, at 136. 143; see N.Y. Times, July 12, 1979. at A20; July 10, 1979, at All;
Feb. 7. 1979. at BI; Feb. 6. 1979, at Al; Nov. 22. 1977. at BI; Feb. 26. 1977. at Al; Nov. 26, 1976, at Al.
209. Tim INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45. at 143; see In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 670, 394 N.E.2d 262, 263. 420
N.Y.S.2d 192. 193 (1979).
210. ht re Torsney. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 670, 394 N.E.2d 262, 263. 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (1979).
211. Id. at 670-71, 394 N.E.2d at 263-64. 420 N.Y.S.2d at 193-94.
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himself or others. 2 12 In a split decision, the court of appeals reinstated the trial court's
conditional release order, concluding that Torsney was no longer suffering from a
mental disease or defect and was no longer a danger to himself or others. 2 13
The authors' criticism of Torsney operates at two levels: one is an analysis of the
procedural and evidentiary rules that were applied in the case, and the other is a
straightforward polemical attack. Winslade and Ross properly recognize, as did the
New York Court of Appeals, that New York's then existing rules for the burden of
proof in insanity cases could explain the apparent contradiction in a finding of
insanity based on mental disease or defect and a recommendation for release by
mental health authorities on lack of mental illness following acquittal.2 14 At the time
of the Torsney case, insanity was a simple defense rather than an affirmative defense;
therefore, an acquittal indicated only that the state failed to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant was sane. 215 Other jurisdictions have narrowed the gap
between what the defendant must prove to establish insanity and what the state must
show for mental commitment 2 16 by casting the insanity plea as an affirmative de-
fense, which requires the defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence. 217 Of course, a distinction remains in that the insanity defense refers to a
mental condition existing at the time of the crime, and civil commitment requires a
showing of present mental illness. Thus, even with the gap in standard of proof
narrowed, the underlying issue of past rather than present mental disorder still may
result in an acquittal without a basis for commitment.21 8
Winslade and Ross cite what they label "another aspect of the foolishness
engendered by the insanity defense" as operating in the Torsnev case. 2 9 "In the trial
itself the defense attorney argued that Torsney was mentally ill; the prosecutor argued
that he was not. Through the post-verdict hearings and appeals, the defense attorney
argued that Torsney was not mentally ill; the prosecution was now obliged to argue
that he was.' '220 The authors attribute this situation to an unreasonable attitude
toward mental illness: "It suggests that we believe insanity is something that comes
and goes quixotically-now you have it, now you don't-and its appearance or
disappearance is unrelated to any other event. "221 Surely, Winslade, a lawyer, must
recognize that the situation he and Ross describe does not stem from such a belief in
the nature of mental illness, but from the requirements of due process. In the criminal
212. In re Torsney, 66 A.D.2d 281,294, 412 N.Y.S.2d 914. 921-22, rer'd. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262. 420
N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979).
213. In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 682, 394 N.E.2d 262, 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 201 (1979).
214. Tiit INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 151-52; see In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 673-74. 394 N.E.2d 262.
265-66, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195-96 (1979).
215. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 673-74, 394 N.E.2d 262, 265-66, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195-96 (1979).
216. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978) (holding due process requires that. in a civil commitment
hearing, the state must bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence).
217. See G. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 43 (reporting that twenty-five states require the defendant to establish his
irresponsibility by a preponderance of the evidence).
218. See In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 676, 394 N.E.2d 262. 267. 420 N.Y.S.2d 192. 197 (1979).





trial, the state must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and must
meet the affirmative defenses offered by the defendant; therefore, the state must
necessarily offer proof that the defendant is sane. 222 Similarly, in the mental commit-
ment hearing, due process requires the state to establish the elements necessary for
involuntary commitment by clear and convincing evidence; therefore, the state must
prove that the defendant is mentally ill. 223 The explanation for the "foolishness"
about which Winslade and Ross complain is the constitutional requirement of due
process, not a theory about the transitory nature of mental illness.
The authors move to greater rhetorical heights when they offer a general judg-
ment about Torsney; they claim that the case "demonstrates the error of trying to use
involuntary treatment as an alternative to punishment."- 224 No real effort is made to
develop an argument to establish this assertion; rather, Winslade and Ross are satis-
fied to rest with a question begging assertion: "If jurors voting for insanity acquittals
are choosing hospitalization as an alternative form of punishment, they should at least
know whether the prospect of treatment (as punishment) is a reality."225 Certainly
nothing in the record of the case suggests that judges, juries, or even commentators
view involuntary mental treatment following an insanity acquittal as punishment or a
substitute for punishment.
Both the majority and the dissent in the New York Court of Appeals opinion
rendered in Torsney make it quite clear that treatment is not to be viewed as punish-
ment or as a substitute for punishment. The majority suggests that there is a need to
avoid transforming "'the hospital into a penitentiary.' "226 It also asserts that
[a]n individual's liberty cannot be deprived by 'warehousing' him in a mental institution
when he is not suffering from a mental illness or defect and in no need of in-patient care
and treatment on a ground which amounts to a presumption of a dangerous propensity
flowing from, as in this case, an isolated, albeit tragic, incident occurring years ago.
227
Finally, the opinion maintains that confinement of the insanity acquittee on any
grounds other than present mental illness and dangerousness "amounts to nothing
more than preventive detention, a concept foreign to our constitutional order."
228
The dissenting opinion makes even clearer the error of the claim that Torsney was an
unsuccessful effort "to use involuntary treatment as an alternative to punish-
ment' 2 29 :
222. See i re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged"); see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that the due process clause permits
placement of the burden of proof of affirmative defenses on the defendant).
223. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978).
224. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 201.
225. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
226. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 677, 394 N.E.2d 262, 267, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 198 (1979).
227. Id. at 682-83, 394 N.E.2d at 271, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
228. Id. at 683, 394 N.E.2d at 271.420 N.Y.S.2d at 201. See also Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
where the United States Supreme Court observed: "Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquit-
tee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. His confinement rests on his continuing illness and dangerous-
ness." Id. at 3052 (footnote omitted).
229. Tim INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45. at 201.
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The verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect presumably resulted from a
finding by the jury that the defendant at the time of the wrongful act suffered from
symptoms which substantially limited his appreciation of "[t]he nature and consequence
of such conduct" or "[t]hat such conduct was wrong." The purpose for institutionalizing
someone acquitted for this reason is two-fold: to protect society from the threat that,
because of a mental disorder, the detainee might again commit acts of violence, . . .and
to rehabilitate him so that he may be released into society without the risk of further harm.
Should the symptoms of the mental disorder disappear both justifications for continued
confinement disappear as well. No longer is the detainee, because of a mental disorder, a
threat to the safety of himself or others. Nor once the symptoms have finally been
remitted, is he in need of rehabilitation. Detention beyond this point would constitute
punishment which is impermissible since the confined person was acquitted by the jury
and found not to have been responsible for his actions when the wrongful act was
committed.
230
The court of appeals correctly stated the law, and the polemics of Winslade and
Ross will not alter the fact that this is the law. The jury may have been mistaken in its
finding of mental disease or defect, the treating physicians may have erred in finding
no present mental illness, and the releasing courts may have erred in concurring in the
finding that Torsney was no longer mentally ill. None of these possibilities, however,
supports the claim that the insanity defense failed in Torsney because he was not
punished by continued detention in a hospital as a substitute for incarceration in a
prison.
6. Ernest Smith, Jr.
The sixth case discussed by Winslade and Ross is that of Ernest Smith, Jr., who
was charged with felony murder in a robbery, convicted, and sentenced to death.23 '
The principal focus of the discussion is a critique of psychiatric evidence offered as
the basis for prediction of dangerousness. At the penalty phase of Smith's trial, under
the Texas bifurcated trial procedure, a court-appointed psychiatrist who had ex-
amined the defendant offered testimony to the effect that Smith was not mentally ill,
not treatable, and "Ithat certainly Mr. Smith is going to go ahead and commit other
similar or same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do so." 2 3 2 The jury's finding
at the penalty phase that Smith would probably commit criminal acts in the future
resulted in mandatory imposition of the death penalty. 233 As a result of an appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, the death sentence was vacated on the grounds that
Smith's attorney had not been given a report of the psychiatrist's examination and
that the defendant had not been given required warnings prior to the examination or
230. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 689, 394 N.E.2d 262, 279, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 205-06 (1979) (dissenting opinion) (citations
omitted).
23 1. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 159-80; see Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977). affd,
602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), affd, 451 U.S. 454 (1980); Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). See generally White, Waiver and the Death Penati: The Inplications of Estelle v. Smith.
72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1522 (1981); Note, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Psychiatric Eraminations:
Implications of Estelle v. Smith, 50 GEo. WASt. L. REv. 275 (1982). Note, Estelle v. Smith: Expanding Constitutional
Safeguards in Sentencing Proceedings, 9 OHtO N.U.L. REv. 529 (1982).
232. THE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 168-69.
233. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 460 (1980).
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informed that the examination could be used in the sentencing hearing.2 34 The
Court's decision, however, did not preclude the use of psychiatric testimony at any
penalty or sentencing hearings.
235
Winslade and Ross criticize the Smith case as one which "exemplifies the
problem of psychiatric testimony, even if insanity is not at issue, when psychiatrists
become advocates for specific decisions, using the cloak of their medical authority in
the absence of any expert information on the topic at hand." 236 The issue raised by
the Smith case, however, is more complex than a matter of psychiatric advocacy; it is
really an issue of the prediction of dangerousness and the need to develop both legal
and psychiatric criteria that are reliable and workable.2 37 As the United States Su-
preme Court noted in its opinion in Estelle v. Smith, 2 3 8 "'[P]rediction of future
criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout
our criminal justice system.' ,239 The Supreme Court similarly recognized the need
to utilize psychiatric evidence in making predictions of dangerousness. Castigating
psychiatric evidence is an improper response; rather, criteria should be developed for
judging the relevance and reliability of psychiatric evidence to particular issues aris-
ing in law courts.
7. John Hinckley
The final case discussed by Winslade and Ross is that of John Hinckley, who
was charged with attempted assassination of the President of the United States,
assault on a federal officer, and related offenses under the District of Columbia
Code. 240 The authors' criticism of the insanity verdict rendered in the Hinckley case
is focused on what they perceive to be a failure of the jury system to operate within
the parameters established by the insanity defense. Their general assessment is that
"[tihe case of John Hinckley shows how jury members are manipulated not only by
psychiatrists but also by one another.'"241 Winslade and Ross suggest that Hinckley
can be criticized along the general lines developed throughout the book, including
problems inherent in allocating responsibility, difficulties in identifying mental states
234. Id. at 466-71.
235. Id. at 472-73.
236. THE INSANITY Pt.EA, supra note 45, at 201-02.
237. See Dershowitz, The Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, I INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 63 (1978);
Hammond, Predictions of Dangerousness in Texas: Psychotherapists' Conflicting Duties, Their Potential Liability, and
Possible Solutions, 12 ST. MARY's L.J. 141 (1980); Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues in Law
and Psychology, 33 Ama. PSYCHOLOGIST 224 (1978). See generally J. MONAHAN, THE CuNICAL PREDICTION OF VIoLEr
BEHAVIOR (1981).
238. 451 U.S. 454 (1980).
239. Id. at 473 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1976)).
240. TIlE INSANITY PLEA. supra note 45, at 181-97. See generalle The Insanit" Plea on Trial, NEWSWEEK, May 24.
1982. at 56; Insane on All Counts, TiSIE, July 5, 1982, at 22; Hincklev Cleared but Is Held Insane in Reagan Attack. N.Y.
Times, June 22, 1981, at Al, col. 6 & D27. col. 1. A number of judicial opinions have arisen out of pretrial litigation
concerning statements made by Hinckley to authorities in psychiatric examinations. See United States v. Hinckley, 672
F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hinckley, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Hinckley, 525
F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981). See also Hinckley's Trial Competence Exan, Statements Not Suppressed. 6 MENTAL
DIsABILrrY L. Ru'. 69, 69-70 (1982): "Poisoned Fruit" Not Admissible. 6 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 70 (1982).
241. THlE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45. at 202.
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that mitigate guilt, problems with post-acquittal disposition, and, above all, the
asserted process whereby the jury empathizes and develops an understanding of the
behavior of the defendant. 2
42
The authors give three issues particular attention in discussing Hinckley: the
legal standard for insanity,243 the placement of the burden of proof,2 4 and the use of
scientific test results. 245 The test for insanity is viewed as raising two problems: the
lack of a well-defined standard for incapacity and the difficulty of determining as a
matter of fact whether sufficient incapacity exists. Addressing the latter problem,
Winslade and Ross maintain: "The problem of how much capacity or how much
understanding is always present and essentially insoluble." 246 On the former ques-
tion, the authors assert: "Sanity and insanity are, of course, legal, not psychiatric,
terms. The law has been notoriously unsuccessful in defining insanity." 24 7 Certainly
the law has attempted to define insanity, for what else were judges and code drafters
doing when they developed the M'Naghten rules or the Model Penal Code test? The
law is open-ended to a degree, permitting the jury to use its notions of normalcy and
its understanding of the community sense of justice. This is reflected in statutory
standards such as that of the Model Penal Code, which requires a lack of "substantial
capacity" to appreciate the nature of one's actions or to conform the actions to the
requirements of the law.24 8 Judicial opinions also recognize the existence of and the
need for jury discretion in considering the insanity plea; as the Brawner court
observed:
The jury is concerned with applying the community understanding of this broad rule to
particular lay and medical facts. When the matter is unclear it naturally will call on its own
sense of justice to help it determine the matter. There is wisdom in the view that a jury
generally understands well enough that an instruction composed in flexible terms gives it
sufficient latitude so that, without disregarding the instruction, it can provide that applica-
tion of the instruction which harmonizes with its sense of justice. 249
Concern with existing insanity tests is proper: there is certainly merit in the sugges-
tions that the test should be limited to cases in which capacity to appreciate or
understand the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of one's action is impaired,
and that tests which provide an independent criteria focusing on ability to conform or
recognize an irresistible impulse ought to be abandoned.2 50 The problems with some
of the current tests, however, do not justify abandoning the insanity defense.
242. Id. at 183-89.
243. id. at 188-89.
244. Id. at 189-91.
245. Id. at 191-93.
246. Id. at 188.
247. Id. at 189.
248. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
249. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
250. See, e.g., COMPREIENSIVE CRIME CONTROL AcT OF 1983: A PROPOSAL TO THE CONGRESS FROM THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 98-32, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 170 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Com-
PREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL AcT], which provides in § 502 the following amendment to IS U.S.C. § 1 (1976):
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of
the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate
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Winslade and Ross correctly report that the federal law, under which Hinckley
was tried, required the prosecution to prove, once the insanity issue properly was
raised, that the defendant was sane beyond a reasonable doubt.2 5' Jurors were quoted
by the press as saying that they felt compelled to hand down a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity because of the law on burden of proof.252 According to Winslade
and Ross, "It is, however, hard to imagine how any prosecutor could prove John
Hinckley, or anyone else, for that matter, sane beyond a reasonable doubt.' 253 They
conclude that "[p]lacing the burden of proving sanity on the prosecution and then
requiring that the standard of proof be 'beyond a reasonable doubt' should have
assured a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict for John Hinckley. -2' The authors'
criticism of the placement of the burden of proof of sanity on the prosecution has
merit; certainly the suggestions that have been made by legislators and commentators
for casting the insanity defense as an affirmative defense deserve serious con-
sideration. 2
55
The third basis for criticism of the Hinckley case emphasized by Winslade and
Ross is the admission of technical test results by the defense "to bolster the assertion
that Hinckley was schizophrenic."- 256 Two objections are directed at this evidence.
The first is that it carries undue weight with the jurors since they are likely to focus on
the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense.
Id. at 170. See generally D. HERMANN, supra note 15. at 128-52; Bonnie, supra note 1I, at 194.
25 1. THE INSANTrY PLEA, supra note 45. at 189. See Trial Transcript, vol. 83, United States v. Hinckley, Crim. No.
81-306 (D.D.C. June 18, 1982), reprinted in Hearings on tie Insanity Defense, supra note I. at 183, 191-92, for the
instruction given to the Hinckley jury that provided:
The burden is on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant was not suffering
from a mental disease or defect on March 30. 1981. or else that he nevertheless had substantial capacity on that
date both to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct.
If the Government has not established this to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall
bring a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
252. TItE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 189. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 13-16. observing:
If the Law truly means what it says, then John W. Hinckley Jr. had to be found not guilty of the attempted
murder of the President of the United States. Not because he didn't do it-and not even because the defense
proved that mental illness caused his acts-but because the jury could not help entertaining a reasonable doubt
about Hinckley's sanity at the time of the shooting. As a matter of logic, that reasonable doubt left no lawful
choice but to acquit the man who shot President Reagan and three other people in full view of hundreds of
millions of television watchers.
Id. at 13.
253. TE INSANITY PLEA, supra note 45, at 189.
254. Id. at 190.
255. See, e.g., COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL AcT, supra note 250, at 170 ("The defendant has the burden of
proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence."). See also Kaufman, The Insanily Plea on Trial, N.Y.
Times, August 8, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 16, 16-20. Judge Kaufman suggests consideration of placing the burden of
proof on the defendant:
[Q]uite a few states and the District of Columbia now shift the burden of proof to the defendant and require him
to show by a preponderance of evidence, that, at the time of his crime, he lacked the requisite mental capacity to
be responsible. The British also place the burden of proof on the defendant. Given the difficulty in proving an
individual sane beyond a reasonable doubt, especially when that person has committed a heinous offense, a rule
placing the burden of proof on the defendant seems preferable.
Id. at 20.
256. TiHE INSANITY PLEA. supra note 45, at 191. The authors emphasize the admission of "a CAT scan-a kind of
X-ray of the brain using computerized axial tomography." Id.
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this "hard evidence-visual, physiological findings" to rationalize their verdict.2 7
The second is that this evidence is pseudo-scientific, or at least open to dispute among
medical authorities. 258 The result, according to The Insanity Plea, is that
[a] jury of twelve very ordinary people were left to decide whether group A of highly
trained medical specialists was correct in thinking that there was some relationship be-
tween Hinckley's brain quantity and his behavior, or whether group B of highly trained
medical specialists was correct in saying that there was no known link between Hinckley's
brain quantity and his behavior.2
5 9
Although there may be grounds for considering whether the relevance of this data to a
jury charged with the ultimate responsibility of determining the existence of mental
disease or defect outweighs the prejudical effect of such evidence, the authors'
account of Hinckley undercuts the significance of their stated concern with this
evidence. They state that subsequent reports of the jury deliberations "suggest that
technical legal questions and technical medical questions were the last thing on their
minds." 260 "The jurors seemed to focus on a narrow view of life, a view that seemed
reasonable to them. John Hinckley certainly didn't seem reasonable to them.' 261 In a
sense, the authors' critique is addressed less to issues about the nature and quality of
the evidence and more to what they consider to be the inadequacy of the jury's
deliberations in Hinckley.
III. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the seven cases examined in The Insanity Plea, the authors make
four recommendations: (1) the elimination of the insanity defense, (2) the elimination
of most psychiatric testimony, including all testimony by psychiatrists about the
defendant's state of mind, (3) the adoption of the guilty but mentally ill plea, and (4)
the separation of guilt and penalty phases of a trial when the defendant pleads mental
illness.26 2 Adoption of these recommendations would constitute a radical transforma-
tion of the criminal law and a clear abandonment of traditional concepts of criminal
guilt and responsibility. Although these recommendations may have merit, the case
analyses provided by Winslade and Ross are insufficient to support the need for or to
provide justification for this radical abandonment of the present criminal law.
The general public would be mistaken to formulate its opinion about the insanity
defense from, and officials would err in basing any action on, the case analysis and
argument developed in The Insanity Plea. The case studies suffer from misleading
statements and exaggerated analysis. The argument developed is polemical rather
than reasoned. Most certainly the book suffers from the lack of an empirical base to
support the sweeping recommendations made by its authors.
257. Id. at 192.
258. id. Winslade and Ross set forth the prosecution's argument against admitting the CAT-scan results: "'there was
no evidence, either diagnostic or causal, to link reduced brain tissue to schizophrenia."
259. Id.
260. Id. at 193.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 201.
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Winslade and Ross anticipate rejection of their proposals on a principled basis
by those who would support the insanity defense and traditional ideas of guilt and
responsibility when they remark: "Many will complain that the elimination of the not
guilty by reason of insanity plea is a symbolic blow to our moral stature as a society
willing to extend understanding and compassion toward our less fortunate
members." 263 The issue is not one of "understanding and compassion," however; at
issue is the moral status of the criminal law itself. Punishment necessarily requires
blameworthiness. To punish persons who are insane, who suffer an impairment of
understanding so that they lack the capacity for conforming conduct, is to punish
persons who are beyond blaming. As one commentator has stated:
The criminal law as we know it today does associate a substantial condemnatory onus with
conviction for a crime. So long as this is so a just and humane legal system has an
obligation to make a distinction between those who are eligible for this condemnation and
those who are not. 26
Winslade and Ross commit the fallacy of equivocation 265 when they claim that
abolition of the insanity defense will have the effect that "[t]he guilty will be found
guilty." ' 266 The authors equate status as a causal agent with criminal guilt. But
criminal guilt supposes a responsible, not merely a causal agent. The significance of
the insanity defense is that it provides the criteria by which society can establish,
according to philosophical tradition, who is a responsible person. Without the legal
defense of insanity, the criminal law, and society itself, would be deprived of an
essential instrument for determining the proper subjects of punishment. A crucial
distinction exists between the individual who has freely and knowingly undertaken to
inflict violence or harm on another person and the individual who has brought about
identical harm while being in the grip of a mental condition precluding appreciation
and control of his action. The legal defense of insanity captures this crucial distinc-
tion.
263. Id. at 223-24.
264. Kadish, supra note 116, at 283.
265. See S. ENGEL, Wrrs GOOD REAsON: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL FALLACIES (1976). The author describes
the logical error implicit in the argument made by Winslade and Ross:
To commit the fallacy of equivocation is to allow a key word in an argument to shift its meaning in the course of
an argument. Consider this example:
2) Only man is rational.
No woman is a man.
Therefore no woman is rational.
This argument would be valid if the word nsan had the same meaning each time it occurred. But for the first
premise to be true, man must mean human, whereas it must mean male for the second premise to be true. When
the change in meaning of a key word during an argument is especially subtle, the conclusion will seem to follow
clearly from the premises and the argument will appear considerably more sound than it is.
Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
266. THE INSANrIY PLEA, supra note 45, at 226.
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